Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Volume 2 (of 3) — Georg Hegel — John Shaqi
Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Volume 2 (of 3)
Georg Hegel · en
In connection with this observation, the distinction is to be called
to mind which was drawn when we were speaking above (pp. 84, 88)
of Plato’s Philosophy of Nature: the eternal world, as God holy in
Himself, is reality, not a world above us or beyond, but the present
world looked at in its truth, and not as it meets the senses of those
who hear, see, &c. When we thus study the content of the Platonic
Idea, it will become clear that Plato has, in fact, represented Greek
morality according to its substantial mode, for it is the Greek
state-life which constitutes the true content of the Platonic Republic.
Plato is not the man to dabble in abstract theories and principles; his
truth-loving mind has recognized and represented the truth, and this
could not be anything else than the truth of the world he lived in, the
truth of the one spirit which lived in him as well as in Greece. No man
can overleap his time, the spirit of his time is his spirit also; but
the point at issue is, to recognize that spirit by its content.
On the other hand, a constitution that would be perfect in respect
to one nation, is to be regarded as not, perhaps, suitable for every
nation. Thus, when it is said that a true constitution does not do
for men as they now are, we must no doubt keep in mind that the more
excellent a nation’s constitution is, it renders the nation also so
much the more excellent; but, on the other hand, since the morals
commonly practised form the living constitution, the constitution in
its abstraction is nothing at all in its independence; it must relate
itself to the common morality, and be filled with the living spirit
of the people. It can, therefore, certainly not be said that a true
constitution suits any and every nation; and it is quite the case that
for men as they are—for instance, as they are Iroquois, Russians,
French—not every constitution is adapted. For the nation has its place
in history. But as the individual man is trained in the state, that
is, as individuality is raised into universality, and the child grows
into a man, so is every nation trained; or barbarism, the condition in
which the nation is a child, passes over into a rational condition.
Men do not remain at a standstill, they alter, as likewise do their
constitutions. And the question here is, What is the true constitution
which the nation must advance towards; just as it is a question which
is the true science of mathematics or of anything else, but not
whether children or boys should possess this science, as they must
rather be first so educated that they may be capable of understanding
it. Thus the true constitution stands before the nation of history,
so that it may advance towards it. Every nation in course of time
makes such alterations in its existing constitution as will bring it
nearer to the true constitution. The nation’s mind itself shakes off
its leading-strings, and the constitution expresses the consciousness