Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Volume 3 (of 3) — Georg Hegel — John Shaqi
Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Volume 3 (of 3)
Georg Hegel · en
There is kindled here the strife between so-called revelation and reason,
in which the latter emerges independently, and the former is separated
from it. Up to this time both were one, or the light of man was the
light of God; man had not a light of his own, but his light was held to
be the divine. The Scholastics had no knowledge having a content of its
own beyond the content of religion; philosophy remained entirely formal.
But now it came to have a content of its own, which was opposed to the
content of religion; or reason felt at least that it had its own content,
or was opposing the form of reasonableness to the immediate content of
the other.
This opposition had a different meaning in former times from what it
bears now-a-days; the earlier meaning is this, that faith is the doctrine
of Christianity, which is given as truth, and by which as truth man has
to remain. We have here faith in this content, and opposed to this stands
conviction by means of reason. But now this faith is transferred into the
thinking consciousness itself; it is a relation of self-consciousness
itself to the facts which it finds within itself, not to the objective
content of the doctrine. In respect to the earlier opposition a
distinction must be drawn in the objective creed; the one part of it is
the teaching of the Church as dogma, the teaching as to the nature of
God, that He is Three in One; to this pertains the appearing of God in
the world, in the flesh, the relation of man to this divine nature, His
holiness and divinity. That is the part which has to do with the eternal
verities, the part which is of absolute interest for men; this part is
in its content essentially speculative, and can be object only for the
speculative Notion. The other part, belief in which is also required, has
reference to other external conceptions, which are connected with that
content; to this pertains the whole extent of what belongs to history,
in the Old and New Testament as well as in the Church. A belief in all
this finite element may be demanded also. If a man, for instance, did
not believe in ghosts, he would be taken for a free-thinker, an atheist:
it would be just the same if a man did not believe that Adam in Paradise
ate of the forbidden fruit. Both parts are placed upon the one level; but
it tends to the destruction of Church and faith, when belief is demanded
for these parts alike. It is to the external conceptions that attention
has been chiefly directed by those who have been decried as opponents of
Christianity and as atheists, down to the time of Voltaire. When external
conceptions such as these are held to firmly, it is inevitable that
contradictions should be pointed out.
5. PETRUS RAMUS.