Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Volume 3 (of 3)
Georg Hegel · en
In modern times things are very different; now we no longer see
philosophic individuals who constitute a class by themselves. With the
present day all difference has disappeared; philosophers are not monks,
for we find them generally in connection with the world, participating
with others in some common work or calling. They live, not independently,
but in the relation of citizens, or they occupy public offices and take
part in the life of the state. Certainly they may be private persons,
but if so, their position as such does not in any way isolate them from
their other relationships. They are involved in present conditions, in
the world and its work and progress. Thus their philosophy is only by
the way, a sort of luxury and superfluity. This difference is really
to be found in the manner in which outward conditions have taken shape
after the building up of the inward world of religion. In modern times,
namely, on account of the reconciliation of the worldly principle with
itself, the external world is at rest, is brought into order—worldly
relationships, conditions, modes of life, have become constituted and
organized in a manner which is conformable to nature and rational. We
see a universal, comprehensible connection, and with that individuality
likewise attains another character and nature, for it is no longer the
plastic individuality of the ancients. This connection is of such power
that every individuality is under its dominion, and yet at the same time
can construct for itself an inward world. The external has thus been
reconciled with itself in such a way that both inward and outward may be
self-sufficing and remain independent of one another; and the individual
is in the condition of being able to leave his external side to external
order, while in the case of those plastic forms the external could only
be determined entirely from within. Now, on the contrary, with the
higher degree of strength attained by the inward side of the individual,
he may hand the external over to chance; just as he leaves clothing to
the contingencies of fashion, not considering it worth while to exert
his understanding upon it. The external he leaves to be determined by
the order which is present in the particular sphere in which his lot is
cast. The circumstances of life are, in the true sense, private affairs,
determined by outward conditions, and do not contain anything worthy of
our notice. Life becomes scholarly, uniform, commonplace, it connects
itself with outwardly given relationships and cannot represent or set
itself forth as a form pertaining only to itself. Man must not take up
the character of showing himself an independent form, and giving himself
a position in the world created by himself. Because the objective power
of external relationships is infinitely great, and for that reason
the way in which I perforce am placed in them has become a matter of
indifference to me, personality and the individual life generally
are equally indifferent.