Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Volume 3 (of 3) — Georg Hegel — John Shaqi
Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Volume 3 (of 3)
Georg Hegel · en
On account of this new beginning to Philosophy we find in the old
histories of Philosophy of the seventeenth century—_e.g._ that of
Stanley—the philosophy of the Greeks and Romans only, and Christianity
forms the conclusion. The idea was that neither in Christianity nor
subsequently any philosophy was to be found, because there was no longer
a necessity for it, seeing that the philosophic theology of the Middle
Ages had not free, spontaneous thought as its principle (Vol. I. pp. 111,
112). But though it is true that this has now become the philosophic
principle, we must not expect that it should be at once methodically
developed out of thought. The old assumption is made, that man only
attains to the truth through reflection; this plainly is the principle.
But the determination and definition of God, the world of the manifold as
it appears, is not yet revealed as necessarily proceeding from thought;
for we have only reached the thought of a content which is given through
ordinary conception, observation, and experience.
On the one hand we see a metaphysic, and, on the other, the particular
sciences: on the one hand abstract thought as such, on the other its
content taken from experience; these two lines in the abstract stand
opposed to one another, and yet they do not separate themselves so
sharply. We shall indeed come to an opposition, viz. to that between
_a priori_ thought—that the determinations which are to hold good
for thought must be taken from thought itself—and the determination
that we must commence, conclude and think from experience. This is
the opposition between rationalism and empiricism; but it is really
a subordinate one, because even the metaphysical mode in philosophy,
which only allows validity to immanent thought, does not take what is
methodically developed from the necessity of thought, but in the old
way derives its content from inward or outward experience, and through
reflection and meditation renders it abstract. The form of philosophy
which is first reached through thought is metaphysics, the form of the
thinking understanding; this period has, as its outstanding figures,
Descartes and Spinoza, likewise Malebranche and Locke, Leibnitz and
Wolff. The second form is Scepticism and Criticism with regard to the
thinking understanding, to metaphysics as such, and to the universal
of empiricism; here we shall go on to speak of representatives of the
Scottish, German, and French philosophies; the French materialists again
turn back to metaphysics.
CHAPTER I
THE METAPHYSICS OF THE UNDERSTANDING