Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Volume 3 (of 3)
Georg Hegel · en
“Fourteenth Proposition: No other substance than God can either exist or
be conceived. Proof: God is the absolutely infinite substance, to whom
can be denied no attribute which expresses the essence of substance,
and He exists necessarily; therefore if there were a substance other
than God, it must be explained by means of an attribute of God.”
Consequently the substance would not have its own being, but that of
God, and therefore would not be a substance. Or if it were still to be
substance, “then there would necessarily follow the possibility of there
being two substances with the same attribute, which according to the
fifth proposition is absurd. From this it then follows that the thing
extended and the thing that thinks” are not substances, but “are either
attributes of God, or affections of His attributes.” By these proofs and
others like them not much is to be gained. “Fifteenth, proposition: What
is, is in God, and cannot exist or be conceived without God.” “Sixteenth
proposition: By the necessity of the divine nature infinite things must
follow in infinite modes, _i.e._, all that can fall under the infinite
understanding. God is therefore the absolute First Cause.”[196]
Spinoza then ascribes freedom and necessity to God: “God is the absolute
free cause, who is determined by nothing outside of Himself, for He
exists solely by the necessity of His nature. There is no cause which
inwardly or outwardly moves Him to act, except the perfection of His
nature. His activity is by the laws of His Being necessary and eternal;
what therefore follows from His absolute nature, from His attributes,
is eternal, as it follows from the nature of the triangle from eternity
and to eternity that its three angles are equal to two right angles.”
That is to say, His Being is His absolute power; _actus_ and _potentia_,
Thought and Being, are in Him one. God has not therefore any other
thoughts which He could not have actualized. “God is the immanent cause
of all things, not the transient (_transiens_),” _i.e._, external
cause. “His essence and His existence are the same, namely, the truth.
A thing which is determined to perform some action, is, since God is
cause, necessarily determined thereto by God; and a thing which is thus
determined cannot render itself undetermined. In nature nothing is
contingent. Will is not a free cause, but only a necessary cause, only a
mode; it is therefore determined by another. God acts in accordance with
no final causes (_sub ratione boni_). Those who assert that He does so,
appear to establish something apart from God, which does not depend on
God, and which God in His working keeps in view, as though it were an
end. If this view is taken, God is not a free cause, but is subject to
fate. It is equally inadmissible to subject all things to the arbitrary
pleasure of God, _i.e._, to His indifferent will.”[197] He is determined
solely by His own nature; the activity of God is thus His power, and that
is necessity.