Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Volume 3 (of 3)
Georg Hegel · en
language—that we also understand this to be the meaning in every-day
life, or in other words that the name is correct—has no philosophic
significance. But if the proposition is not one like this, but an
ordinary proposition, and if the predicate is not the Notion, but some
general term or other, a predicate of the subject, such propositions are
really not philosophic: we might instance the statement that substance
is one and not several, but only that in which substance and unity are
the same. Or, in other words, this unity of the two moments is the very
thing which the proof has to demonstrate, it is the Notion or the
essence. In this case it looks as if the proposition were the matter
of chief importance, the truth. But if in these really only so-called
propositions, subject and predicate are in truth not alike, because one
is individual and the other universal, their relation is essential,
_i.e._ the reason for which they are one. The proof has here a false
position indeed, as if that subject were implicit or in itself, whereas
subject and predicate are, fundamentally even, moments in separation;
in the judgment “God is One,” the subject itself is universal, since
it resolves itself into unity. On the other side it is implied in this
false position that the proof is brought in from outside merely, as in
mathematics from a preceding proposition, and that the proposition is not
therefore conceived through itself; thus we see the ordinary method of
proof take its middle term, the principle, from anywhere it can, in the
same way as in classification it takes its principle of classification.
The proposition is then, as it were, a secondary affair; but we must
ask if this proposition is true. The result as proposition ought to be
truth, but is only knowledge. The movement of knowledge, as proof, falls
therefore, in the third place, outside of the proposition, which ought
to be the truth. The essential moments of the system are really already
completely contained in the presuppositions of the definitions, from
which all further proofs have merely to be deduced. But whence have we
these categories which here appear as definitions? We find them doubtless
in ourselves, in scientific culture. The existence of the understanding,
the will, extension, is therefore not developed from infinite substance,
but it is directly expressed in these determinations, and that quite
naturally; for of a truth there exists the One into which everything
enters, in order to be absorbed therein, but out of which nothing comes.
For as Spinoza has set up the great proposition, all determination
implies negation (_supra_, p. 267), and as of everything, even of thought
in contrast to extension, it may be shown that it is determined and
finite, what is essential in it rests upon negation. Therefore God alone
is the positive, the affirmative, and consequently the one substance;
all other things, on the contrary, are only modifications of this