Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Volume 3 (of 3)
Georg Hegel · en
Before this ideals were set before us, or Holy Scripture or positive law
was quoted as authoritative. Hobbes, on the contrary, sought to derive
the bond which holds the state together, that which gives the state
its power, from principles which lie within us, which we recognize as
our own. In this way two opposite principles arise. The first is the
passive obedience of subjects, the divine authority of rulers, whose
will is absolute law, and is itself elevated above all other law. All
this is represented in close connection with religion, and proved by
examples from the Old Testament, by such stories as those of Saul and
David. Criminal and marriage laws, too, for long derived their character
from the Mosaic laws, or, speaking generally, from those the provisions
of which possessed their value by the fact of being established by
express divine command. On the other hand we have in the second place
the reasoning wherein we ourselves are the determining agents, and which
was called sound reason. In the movement which Cromwell made use of
there was allied with this a fanaticism, which from the written letter
drew opposite conclusions to the above, and this we see exemplified in
the equality of property, for instance. Hobbes, it is true, likewise
maintained passive obedience, the absolute freedom of the royal will
and power; but at the same time he sought to derive the principles of
monarchical power, etc., from universal determinations. The views that
he adopts are shallow and empirical, but the reasons he gives for them,
and the propositions he makes respecting them, are original in character,
inasmuch as they are derived from natural necessities and wants.
Hobbes maintained that “The origin of all society is to be found in
the mutual fear of all its members;” it is hence a phenomenon in
consciousness. “Each association is thus formed in its own interest or
for its own renown, that is, from selfish motives.” All such matters as
security of life, property, and enjoyment, are not to be found outside
it. “But men have in all dissimilarity of strength a natural similarity
as well.” This Hobbes proves by a characteristic reason, viz. that “each
individual can make away with the other,” each is the ultimate power
over the others. “Each can be supreme.”[235] Thus their similarity is
not derived from the greatest strength; it is not, as in modern times,
founded on the freedom of the spirit, or on an equality of merit and
independence, but on the equal weakness of mankind; each man is weak as
regards others.