Hegel's Philosophy of Mind — Georg Hegel — John Shaqi
Hegel's Philosophy of Mind
Georg Hegel · en
The home of these “relative” virtues—of morality in the ordinary sense—is
the life of the second order in the commonwealth: the order of industry
and commerce. In this sphere the idea of the universal is gradually lost
to view: it becomes, says Hegel, only a thought or a creature of the mind,
which does not affect practice. The materialistic worker of civilisation
does not see further than the empirical existence of individuals: his
horizon is limited by the family, and his final ideal is a competency of
comfort in possessions and revenues. The supreme universal to which he
attains as the climax of his evolution is only money. But it is only with
the vaster development of commerce that this terrible consequence ensues.
At first as a mere individual, he has higher aims, though not the highest.
He has a limited ideal determined by his special sphere of work. To win
respect—the character for a limited truthfulness and honesty and skilful
work—is his ambition. He lives in a conceit of his performance—his
utility—the esteem of his special circle. To his commercial soul the
military order is a scarecrow and a nuisance: military honour is but
trash. Yet if his range of idea is narrow and engrossing in details, his
aim is to get worship, to be recognised as the best in his little sphere.
But with the growth of the trading spirit his character changes: he
becomes the mere capitalist, is denationalised, has no definite work and
can claim no individualised function. Money now measures all things: it is
the sole ultimate reality. It transforms everything into a relation of
contract: even vengeance is equated in terms of money. Its motto is, The
Exchanges must be honoured, though honour and morality may go to the dogs.
So far as it is concerned, there is no nation, but a federation of
shopkeepers. Such an one is the _bourgeois_ (the _Bürger_, as distinct
from the peasant or _Bauer_ and the _Adel_). As an artisan—i.e. a mere
industrial, he knows no country, but at best the reputation and interest
of his own guild-union with its partial object. He is narrow, but honest
and respectable. As a mere commercial agent, he knows no country: his
field is the world, but the world not in its concreteness and variety, but
in the abstract aspect of a money-bag and an exchange. The larger totality
is indeed not altogether out of sight. But if he contribute to the needy,
either his sacrifice is lifeless in proportion as it becomes general, or
loses generality as it becomes lively. As regards his general services to
the great life of his national state(115), they are unintelligently and
perhaps grudgingly rendered.