Hegel's Philosophy of Mind — Georg Hegel — John Shaqi
Hegel's Philosophy of Mind
Georg Hegel · en
(δ) An essential feature of this sensitivity, with its absence of
intelligent and volitional personality, is this, that it is a state of
passivity, like that of the child in the womb. The patient in this
condition is accordingly made, and continues to be, subject to the power
of another person, the magnetiser; so that when the two are thus in
psychical _rapport_, the selfless individual, not really a “person,” has
for his subjective consciousness the consciousness of the other. This
latter self-possessed individual is thus the effective subjective soul of
the former, and the genius which may even supply him with a train of
ideas. That the somnambulist perceives in himself tastes and smells which
are present in the person with whom he stands _en rapport_, and that he is
aware of the other inner ideas and present perceptions of the latter as if
they were his own, shows the substantial identity which the soul (which
even in its concreteness is also truly immaterial) is capable of holding
with another. When the substance of both is thus made one, there is only
one subjectivity of consciousness: the patient has a sort of
individuality, but it is empty, not on the spot, not actual: and this
nominal self accordingly derives its whole stock of ideas from the
sensations and ideas of the other, in whom it sees, smells, tastes, reads,
and hears. It is further to be noted on this point that the somnambulist
is thus brought into _rapport_ with two genii and a twofold set of ideas,
his own and that of the magnetiser. But it is impossible to say precisely
which sensations and which visions he, in this nominal perception,
receives, beholds and brings to knowledge from his own inward self, and
which from the suggestions of the person with whom he stands in relation.
This uncertainty may be the source of many deceptions, and accounts among
other things for the diversity that inevitably shows itself among
somnambulists from different countries and under _rapport_ with persons of
different education, as regards their views on morbid states and the
methods of cure, or medicines for them, as well as on scientific and
intellectual topics.
(ε) As in this sensitive substantiality there is no contrast to external
objectivity, so within itself the subject is so entirely one that all
varieties of sensation have disappeared, and hence, when the activity of
the sense-organs is asleep, the “common sense,” or “general feeling”
specifies itself to several functions; one sees and hears with the
fingers, and especially with the pit of the stomach, &c.