Hegel's Philosophy of Mind — Georg Hegel — John Shaqi
Hegel's Philosophy of Mind
Georg Hegel · en
§ 461. Under the shape of memory the course of intelligence passes through
the same inwardising (recollecting) functions, as regards the intuition of
the _word_, as representation in general does in dealing with the first
immediate intuition (§ 451). (1) Making its own the synthesis achieved in
the sign, intelligence, by this inwardising (memorising) elevates the
_single_ synthesis to a universal, i.e. permanent, synthesis, in which
name and meaning are for it objectively united, and renders the intuition
(which the name originally is) a representation. Thus the import
(connotation) and sign, being identified, form one representation: the
representation in its inwardness is rendered concrete and gets existence
for its import: all this being the work of memory which retains names
(retentive Memory).
§ 462. The name is thus the thing so far as it exists and counts in the
ideational realm. (2) In the name, _Reproductive_ memory has and
recognises the thing, and with the thing it has the name, apart from
intuition and image. The name, as giving an _existence_ to the content in
intelligence, is the externality of intelligence to itself; and the
inwardising or recollection of the name, i.e. of an intuition of
intellectual origin, is at the same time a self-externalisation to which
intelligence reduces itself on its own ground. The association of the
particular names lies in the meaning of the features sensitive,
representative, or cogitant,—series of which the intelligence traverses as
it feels, represents, or thinks.
Given the name lion, we need neither the actual vision of the animal, nor
its image even: the name alone, if we _understand_ it, is the unimaged
simple representation. We _think_ in names.