§ 508. But though the good is the universal of will—a universal determined in itself,—and thus including in it particularity,—still so far as this particularity is in the first instance still abstract, there is no principle at hand to determine it. Such determination therefore starts up also outside that universal; and as heteronomy or determinance of a will which is free and has rights of its own, there awakes here the deepest contradiction. (α) In consequence of the indeterminate determinism of the good, there are always _several sorts_ of good and _many kinds of duties_, the variety of which is a dialectic of one against another and brings them into _collision_. At the same time because good is one, they _ought_ to stand in harmony; and yet each of them, though it is a particular duty, is as good and as duty absolute. It falls upon the agent to be the dialectic which, superseding this absolute claim of each, concludes such a combination of them as excludes the rest. § 509. (β) To the agent, who in his existent sphere of liberty is essentially as a _particular_, his _interest and welfare_ must, on account of that existent sphere of liberty, be essentially an aim and therefore a duty. But at the same time in aiming at the good, which is the not-particular but only universal of the will, the particular interest _ought not_ to be a constituent motive. On account of this independency of the two principles of action, it is likewise an accident whether they harmonise. And yet they _ought_ to harmonise, because the agent, as individual and universal, is always fundamentally one identity. (γ) But the agent is not only a mere particular in his existence; it is also a form of his existence to be an abstract self-certainty, an abstract reflection of freedom into himself. He is thus distinct from the reason in the will, and capable of making the universal itself a particular and in that way a semblance. The good is thus reduced to the level of a mere “may happen” for the agent, who can therefore resolve itself to somewhat opposite to the good, can be wicked. § 510. (δ) The external objectivity, following the distinction which has arisen in the subjective will (§ 503), constitutes a peculiar world of its own,—another extreme which stands in no rapport with the internal will-determination. It is thus a matter of chance, whether it harmonises with the subjective aims, whether the good is realised, and the wicked, an aim essentially and actually null, nullified in it: it is no less matter of chance whether the agent finds in it his well-being, and more precisely whether in the world the good agent is happy and the wicked unhappy. But at the same time the world _ought_ to allow the good action, the essential thing, to be carried out in it; it _ought_ to grant the good agent the satisfaction of his particular interest, and refuse it to the wicked; just as it _ought_ also to make the wicked itself null and void.