Prolegomena to the Study of Hegel's Philosophy, and Especially of His Logic
Georg Hegel · en
The mechanical theory of the universe, in the ordinary sense, which
deals with the mathematical formulation of the laws of planetary
movement, had been the work of the seventeenth century. The eighteenth
century had seen attempts to explain the _status quo_ of the
planetary system as a resultant from the evolution of an elementary
molecular state of the cosmic mass. With the close of the eighteenth
century there appeared a group of new sciences dealing with subtler
energies of matter,--with electricity, galvanism, and above all with
the connexions of chemical, electric, and magnetic science. The
ideas thus suggested--embraced with some generality under the title
Polarity--threw light backward upon the old mechanical conceptions,
and gave them a decidedly dynamic character. Even the tranquil rest
of geometrical figures came to be explained as a meeting point and
transition moment of opposite forces. But these ideas produced an even
greater effect on biology. Here, too, the need of a special 'vital
force' to explain life and organisation disappeared: organism was
but a higher stage, a completer truth of mechanism: and both found
their explanation in the antithesis and synthesis of forces, or in
differentiation and integration of what has recently been termed an
'idée-force.' In this direction, so far as Schelling was concerned,
the obvious stimulus came from the programme sketched by Kielmeyer at
Stuttgart in 1793, in a lecture 'on the proportions of organic forces,'
According to Kielmeyer there are three types of force in the animal
organisation, sensibility, irritability and reproduction[5]. The last
of these is the basic force which builds up and propagates the animal
system. With irritability, or contraction in response to external
stimuli--material adaptation to environment--a higher level of animal
life is reached. But the highest of all forces in the living being is
sensibility. In this same order may we reasonably conceive that the
'plan of nature' proceeds. Her first products show little beyond that
reproductive power which makes broad and high the pyramid of life. But
as the creature acquires increasing heterogeneity and a comparatively
independent position, it plays the part of a re-agent against stimuli,
and a source of movements. Lastly, it not merely responds to, but
assimilates and appropriates the impression into a sensation: it
internalises the external, and carries within itself by means of the
sensibility an ever-increasing picture of the world around it.