Prolegomena to the Study of Hegel's Philosophy, and Especially of His Logic
Georg Hegel · en
But the 'productive intuition' is, as Kant would say, blind: it is
unconscious in its operation: and it is only after an arrest, a Sabbath
when it surveys and judges its work, that it begins to realise itself
through a process of analysis and reflection which elicits and fixes
the categories that have been operative in it. By this abstraction
intelligence rises out of mere production to intelligent and conscious
production, i.e. to volition, where it has an ideal and realises it.
With volition and voluntary action, objectivity is to appearance
further certified and fortified. It is as active, i. e. as free, and
even moral, agents, that we set forward categorically the reality of
the world. So, too, Fichte had declared. But, as Schelling reminds
us, with this intensified assertion of a law and an ideal to which
the real must and shall correspond,--with the declaration that the
realm of absolute consistency and ideal truth of reason is the true
and real for ever and ever--we come across the fundamental antithesis
of the 'Is' and the 'Ought,5 of the objective and subjective, of
unconscious necessity and self-conscious freedom. With an attempt to
get a philosophy of history,--i. e. of man and mind as the culminating
truth of things, we see ourselves confronted with the opposition of
fatalism and chance. On one hand history is only possible for beings
who have an ideal in view,--one persistent aim and principle which
their work and will is the means of realising. And yet it is an ideal
which only the series of generations, only the whole race, can realise.
Man's license to do or to refrain rests upon a larger, latent, divine
necessity which constrains it. What human agents by their free choice
determine and carry out, is carried out, in the long run, by the force
of an everlasting and unchanging order, to which their wills seem but
a mere plaything. But that man's free agency should thus harmonise
with the constrained uniformities of nature is only possible on the
assumption that both are phenomena of a common ground, or basis of
identity, of an 'absolute identity, in which there is no duplication,
and which for that reason, because the condition of all consciousness
is duplication, can never reach consciousness. This ever-Unconscious,
which, as it were the everlasting Sun in the spirit-kingdom, is hidden
in its own undimmed light, and which, though it is never an object,
still impresses its identity on all free objects, is simultaneously
the same for all intelligences, the invisible "root" of which all
intelligences are only the "powers," and the everlasting mediator
between the self-determining subjective in us and the objective or
percipient,--simultaneously the ground of the uniformity in freedom,
and of the freedom in uniformity of the objective[14].' To rise to the
sense of this Absolute Identity, as common basis of harmony between the
'Ought' and the 'Is,' is to recognise Providence: it is Religion.