Prolegomena to the Study of Hegel's Philosophy, and Especially of His Logic
Georg Hegel · en
had slumbered in times of easy-going peace. The days of adversity and
humiliation taught men that the march of literary culture is not the
all-in-all of life and history.
It was made apparent, practically at least, that intelligence, with
its hard and fast formulae, its logical principles, its keen analysis,
was not deep enough or wide enough to justify its claim to the august
title of reason. To be reasonable implies a more comprehensive,
patient, many-sided observation than is necessary to prove the claim
to mere intelligence. To be intelligent is to seize the right means
to execute a given or accepted end--it is to be quick and correct in
the practice of life, to carry out in detail what has been determined
on in general. Understanding plays upon the surface of life and deals
with the momentary case: and its greatest praise is to be fleet in
the application of principles, apt to detect the point on which to
direct action, correct in its estimate of means to ends. Clearsighted,
prudent, and direct, it is the supreme virtue in a given sphere: but
the sphere must be given, and its end constituted in the measured round
of practical life, its system complete: or, understanding is bewildered
before a hopeless puzzle. Understanding is--the improvident cynic might
say--a certain animal-like sagacity--(such cynical philosophers were
perhaps Hobbes and Schopenhauer[3])--a mere power of carrying out a
given rule in a new but similar case, and of doing so, perhaps, through
a long chain of intermediate links and means.