Prolegomena to the Study of Hegel's Philosophy, and Especially of His Logic
Georg Hegel · en
The advice, so often associated with Francis Bacon, to get rid of all
false pre-conceptions, of all _idola,_ is one which it is easy to
mistake in an over-zeal to follow it. That mere negation of prejudices
which we call childish innocence is no match for the craft by which
Nature seeks to keep or disguise her secrets. The free consciousness,
the unbiassed mind, is not the easy result of one great act of
renunciation, but the work of continued self-discipline, self-conquest,
self-realisation. If you are not to impose upon the thing a
pre-conception alien to it, neither must you rashly give yourself away
to the thing, or to the first whims which accident puts upon you as the
thing. What seems a fact or thing is only a candidate for the post of
thing or fact: and its credentials need to be examined, and compared
with other evidences. To detect a fact, therefore, is only possible for
a tried and tested consciousness which by patience and self-mastery has
won the key of interpretation. What Bacon apparently meant--though,
as often happens, in his eagerness to combat a prevailing folly, he
sometimes overshot himself in statement--was to insist on the eternal
wedlock of the mind and things, of things and the mind, as the sole
and sufficient condition for the reality of knowledge and truth. The
mind may not presume to do without things, or things to domineer the
mind;--or the result is a windy and frothy vanity. And the wedlock
is eternal: in his own eloquent words, 'the mind itself is but an
accident to knowledge[7],' and he might have added, so also are things:
for, as he says, 'the truth of being and the truth of knowing is all
one': only in the bond of knowledge are things true and real,--being
otherwise only 'permanent possibilities,' or possibilities barely even
permanent--or not even possibilities. Yet he scarcely realised that
his 'due rejections and exclusions' and negations were a fundamental
_constitutive_ element in those facts of which he habitually emphasises
only the positive side.