Prolegomena to the Study of Hegel's Philosophy, and Especially of His Logic — Georg Hegel — John Shaqi
Prolegomena to the Study of Hegel's Philosophy, and Especially of His Logic
Georg Hegel · en
'I am not what I see,
And other than the things I touch.'
And that something we would not lose, at any cost.--But the only way
not to lose it, is to use it as a stepping-stone to higher things. The
metaphor, indeed, like metaphors in general, must not be pressed too
far. For it is more than a stepping-stone and it is never left behind
as a mere dead self: there is
'Nothing of it that doth fade
But doth suffer a sea-change
Into something rich and strange.'
And that richer result into which it is transformed is the
consciousness of a self, and the intelligence which wills and knows.
If it be asked in what respects the result is richer, the answer is
as follows. The soul,--this 'first entelechy--is exclusive, and it
is immersed in its natural limits of organic life. It has yet to go
through the school of self-detachment, the process of 'erecting itself
above itself'; and of thus extending its view and its range of control
over a wider field of objects. Gradually it attains to the rank of a
consciousness before which is unrolled the spectacle of a world of
objects set over against it, and even of a world within it; itself as
an object deposed to the rank of something to be surveyed. As such,
it seems almost to have left all immersion in corporeity completely
behind, and to have completely divested itself of any limitation. It
floats freely above the real psychical life out of which it emerged--a
detached but somewhat shadowy self, not burdened by any restrictions
of nature or circumstance. As such a mere Ego, or logical self--as the
mere theatre on which the play of ideas takes place, it surveys its
real psychical self far below; it finds itself as a strange sort of
thing, and says _This was me_ (which however is not exactly the same
as _I am I_, I = I). Yet it was a great step to have thus ceased to be
absorbed in its qualities, to be the mere breath of life and feeling,
stirring in its several affections and modifications. In order to
get forward, it was necessary to recoil a little: to save itself--and
that must mean to get itself in fuller and richer being--the mind had,
as it were, to measure and realise the full depth of its nonentity,
and to surrender all that it had hitherto clung to as its own. In an
attitude of reflection upon itself it fancies that it is the empty
room, the _tabula rasa_, on which experience is to write itself: but
in its secret heart it retains the faith and acts upon it, that it is
the power of intelligent and intelligible unity which makes the writing
intelligible, if it does not even itself play the writer. What it now
seems to find--what fills up its consciousness, presumed empty and
merely receptive,--it gradually recognises to be its very and original
own. Through labour and experiment it fills up the vacant form (the
passive half of itself to which it deposed itself) of consciousness;
and thus, as an intelligent self, a true mind, it has for itself and