Prolegomena to the Study of Hegel's Philosophy, and Especially of His Logic — Georg Hegel — John Shaqi
Prolegomena to the Study of Hegel's Philosophy, and Especially of His Logic
Georg Hegel · en
What Plato has sometimes called the act of reminiscence, what he has
sometimes called the instinct of Love, is also known to him as the
process of Dialectic. For reminiscence has to watch and wrestle with
the inertia of oblivion, has to set the imagined beside the real, and
to correct percepts by concepts, concepts by percepts, has to brace
up its energies, and to advance not by mere pressing onward, but by
tacking and zigzagging through contrary difficulties finally realise
itself. And love too is a battle, where the craving for union has to
measure its force with the instinct of independence, where selfishness
and self-surrender seek a reconciliation, and where in the close, if
the close be love, each is self-retained only as self-abandoned, and
each rises to a higher union in which lower selfhoods are absorbed.
Even so in the course of Dialectic. It is the art which divides
and conjoins, which unifies and distinguishes: the art of asking
and answering. To Plato it appears in the main as an action of the
intelligent subject: but an action which, as he hints, is almost a
natural instinct, which through discipline has become an art. In the
hands of its typical artist, it proceeds, or seems to proceed, as if
unconscious of its principle and end. Socrates has, as he professes,
no overt conception of the result: he has no knowledge of the positive
conclusion to be reached. It is the Logos--the logic of reality--which
sustains the movement. Abandoning any subjective humour of carrying
the argument to a preconceived end, one is swept on by the current of
real logic--the reason in things. The dogma we have set up and seemed
to see before us, will, if we are dispassionate, carry us on beyond
itself, and suggest aspects calling for recognition and acceptance. If
only we refrain from arresting the movement of criticism,--a course
to which prudence, ease, custom, and every form of the _ignava ratio_
counsel us,--truth will reveal itself in us, and by us. It is because
other aims, personal and particular, are so ever-present with us, that
speculative free inquiry seems so hard. It is we who insist on closing
up the door, not the truth that is reluctant to show itself.