Prolegomena to the Study of Hegel's Philosophy, and Especially of His Logic
Georg Hegel · en
These are examples of the operation of Understanding. It can only reach
a synthesis (or conjunction), never a real unity, because it believes
in the omnipotence of the abstractions with which it began: but must
either carry out one partial principle to its consequences, or allow
an alternate and combined force to two opposite principles. Its canon
is identity: given something, let us see what follows when we keep the
same point always in view, and compare other points with the one which
we are supposed to know. Its method is analytic: given a conception
in which popular thought supposes itself at home, and let us see all
the elements of truth which can be deduced from it. Its statements are
abstract and narrow: or, in the words of Anaxagoras, one thing is cut
off from another with a hatchet[3]. In its excess it degenerates into
dogmatism, whether that dogmatism be theological or naturalistic.
The fact is that the Understanding, as this analytic, abstract, and
finite action of mind is called,--the thought which holds objective
ideas distinct from one another, and from the subjective faculties of
thought as a whole,--that this Understanding is, when it claims to be
heard and obeyed in science, not sufficiently thorough-going. It begins
at a point which is not so isolated as it seems, but is a member of a
body of thought: nor is it aware that the whole of this body of thought
is in organic, and even more than organic, union. It errs in taking too
much for granted: and in not seeing how this given point is the result
of a process,--that in it, in any thought or idea, several tendencies
or elements converge and are held in union, but with the possibility
of working their way into a new independence. In other words, the
Understanding requires, as the organon and method of philosophy, to
be replaced by the Reason[4],--by infinite thought, concrete, at
once analytic and synthetic. How then, it may be asked, can we make
the passage from the inadequate to the adequate? To that question the
answer may be given that it is our act of arbitrary arrest which halts
at the inadequate: that in complete Reason, which is the constituent
nature both of us and of things, the Understanding is only a grade
which points beyond itself, and therefore presupposes and struggles up
to the adequate thought. In other words, it is Reason which creates or
lays down for behoof of its own organisation the aims, conditions, and
fixed entities,--the objects, by which it is bound and limited in its
analytic exercise as understanding. Reason, therefore, is the implicit
tendency to correct its own inadequacy: and we have only to check
self-will and prejudice so far that the process may be accomplished.