Prolegomena to the Study of Hegel's Philosophy, and Especially of His Logic
Georg Hegel · en
Thought, too, is Being. An old distinction of the Stoics, which not
inaptly represents popular views on this matter, set on one side ὄντα,
existences (which were always corporeal, whether they were the things
we touch and feel, or the words and breathings by which we utter them),
and on the other side the meanings or thoughts proper or σημαινόμενα
(which were incorporeal). These λεκτά, as they were otherwise called,
were to the Stoics the proper sphere of Logic. In the sense therefore
which the Stoics and popular consciousness give to being, the object of
logic does not possess being. It is not corporeal. It cannot however
be said to be in the sphere of non-being. It is rather a part of
reality--of concrete being--which can be considered apart, as if it
stood alone. Alone it does not stand. And yet it holds a position so
fundamental,--is the same theme again and again repeated under endless
variations,--is so obviously the universal of things--that it may
properly form the subject of independent study.
It is, moreover, a part of Reality, which may well claim to stand for
the whole. It is, so to say, the score of the musical composition,
rolled up in its bare, silent, unadorned lineaments; the articulated
theme, besides, and not the mere germinal concept, of all the variety
of melody. But it is only laid up there _in abstracto_, because in
the soul of the composer it had already taken concrete form, due to
his capacity and training, his mental force, his art and science. It
is there that the score has its source. But secondly, the musical work
exists in the performance of the orchestra: in the manipulations of the
several instruments, in the notes of the singers, in all the diversity
of parts which make up the mechanism for unfolding the meaning or
theme--that unreality, that mere thought, which to the stricter Stoic
might be said to have no ὔπαρξις, or bodily subsistence. And there are
still people who will be disposed to assert that it is only in the
multitude of notes of violin, trombone, flute, &c., that the music is
real:--though perhaps these hardy realists do not quite mean what they
say. For what they probably mean, and what is the fact, is that the
music exists as a complete reality in those who have ears and minds
capable of comprehending and enjoying it: in those who can reunite
meaning and theme to execution and orchestration: and we may even add
that it is more and more real, in proportion to the greater power with
which they can bring these two into one.