Prolegomena to the Study of Hegel's Philosophy, and Especially of His Logic
Georg Hegel · en
It is a great step, when we have detected the Relativity of what had
hitherto seemed Absolute,--when a new aspect of the infinite fullness
of the world, the truth of things, dawns upon us. But it is even a
greater step when we see that the Relativity which we have thus
discovered is itself Relative. And this is one advantage of first
studying the value of the categories of ethics and physics on Logical
ground. On the concreter region of Nature and Mind, the several grades
and species into which reality is divided have a portentous firmness
and grandeur about them, and the intrinsic dialectic seems scarcely
adequate to shaking the foundations of their stability. They severally
stand as independent self-sustaining entities, separate from each
other, and stereotyped in their several formations. But in the ether of
abstract Idea, in the fluid and transparent form of mere thoughts, the
several stages in the development of the Absolute, the various grades
of category, clearly betray their Relativity, and by the negation of
this Relativity lead on to a higher Absolute.
To the practical man,--so long as his reflection does not go deep,--the
concepts on which his knowledge and faith are built seem eternal,
unshifting rock, parts of the inmost fabric of things. He accepts them
as ultimate validities. To him matter and force, cause and effect,
distinctions between form and content, whole and part, quantity and
quality, belong to the final constitution of the world. (And so, in a
sense, they do.) If he ever overcome the absoluteness which popular
thought attributes to the individual things of sense and imagination,
and show their relativity, he does so only to fall under the glamour
of a new deception. Causes and matters, forces and atoms, become new
ultimates, new absolutes, of another order. Fictions or postulates of
the understanding take the place of the figments of imagination. The
ordinary scientific man labours especially under the 'metaphysical'
fallacy: he realises abstractions in their abstractness. As against
this it is the business of the logician to show how such terms are to
be interpreted as steps in a process of interpretation--containing so
much that others of simpler structure have handed on, and themselves
presupposing by implication a great deal they fail properly to
explicate. Thus, the logician evinces at one blow the relativity of
each term in its mereness, abstractness, or false absoluteness, and the
ideal absoluteness which always carries it beyond itself, and makes it
mean more than it says.