Prolegomena to the Study of Hegel's Philosophy, and Especially of His Logic
Georg Hegel · en
To the student of language the Categories sometimes present themselves
as pronominal, or formal roots,--those roots which, as it is said, do
not denote things, but relations between things. He meets them in the
inflections of nouns and verbs; in the signs of number, gender, case,
and person: but, as thus presented, their influence is subordinate to
the things of which they are, as it were, the accidents. He meets them
in a more independent and tangible shape in the articles, pronouns,
prepositions, conjunctions, and numerals, and in what are called the
auxiliary verbs. In these apparently trifling, and in some languages
almost non-existent words or parts of words, we have the symbols of
relations,--the means of connexion between single words,--the cement
which binds significant speech together. There are languages, such as
the older and classical forms of Chinese, where these categorising
terms are, as it were, in the air: where they are only felt in accent
and position, and have no separate existence of their own. But in
the languages of the Indo-European family they gradually appear, at
first in combination, perhaps, with the more material roots, and only
in the course of time asserting an independent form. Originally they
appear to denote the relations of space and time,--the generalised or
typical links between the parts of our sense-perceptions: but from
there they are afterwards, and in a little while, transferred into
the service of intellect. These little words are the very life-blood
of a language,--its spirit and force. It is in these categories,
as they show themselves in the different linguistic families, that
a nation betrays its mode and tone of thought. The language of the
Altaic races, e. g., expresses activity only as a piece of property,
an appropriation of a substance, and knows no true distinction of noun
and verb: the Semitic Tongues in their tense-system perhaps betray the
intense inwardness of the race: whereas the immense inflectionalism of
the Indo-European seems not unconnected with his greater versatility
and energy. Complete mastery in the manipulation of these particles
and forms is what makes an idiomatic knowledge of a language, as
distinct from a mere remembrance of the vocabulary. And philosophy
is the recognition of their import and significance. Thus in Greek
philosophy the central questions turn upon such words as Being and
not-Being: Becoming: that out of which: that for the sake of which: the
what-was-being: the what is: the other: the one: the great and small:
that which is upon the whole: what is according to each: this somewhat:
&c.[7] And again in Modern Philosophy, how often has the battle raged
about the meaning of such words as I: will: can: must: because: same
and different: self: &c.!
[Footnote 1: Cf. Herbart's maxim, 'Wie viel Schein, so viel Hindeutung
auf Sein.' (_Hauptpunkte der Metaphysik._)]