Prolegomena to the Study of Hegel's Philosophy, and Especially of His Logic — Georg Hegel — John Shaqi
Prolegomena to the Study of Hegel's Philosophy, and Especially of His Logic
Georg Hegel · en
The first sphere was that of Being directly confronting us, and using
the demonstrative pronouns first of all. The second is Relative or
Reflective Being: and in this we have to deal with the relative
pronouns. The surface of Being is now seen to exhibit a secondary
formation, to involve a sort of permanent standard in itself, and to
be essentially relative. The mere quality, when reduced to number, is
seen to be subjected to a certain measure, rule, sort, or standard:
and this reflex of itself always haunts it, modifying and determining
it. Thus instead of qualities, we begin to speak of the properties of
a thing: we have, as it were, two levels of Being, in intimate and
necessary connexion, where there was only one before. At first it was
but a mere surface-picture, one thing here and another there: a this
and a that; one, _now,_ and another, _then. This,_ it might be, was
round, and _that_ square: _now,_ it was bright, and _then,_ it was
dull: _here_ was a head, and _there_ was a limb. But the comparison of
quality with quantity, measuring one by the other, gave rise to the
conception of something permanent, a true nucleus amid the changes. The
fact, previously single, is now become double: the mere event is now a
phenomenon, a temporary and outward manifestation of something inner.
We now see each that _is,_ in the halo of what it _has been,_ or will
be: the passing modification in the light of the permanent type. But as
yet the permanent and the passing are separate, and only throw light
on each other: A explaining itself by B and B by A. We have apparently
two facts; neither of which can however stand by itself and therefore
refers us to the other. But to get a real rest in this incessant round
of mutual reference of one to another we must take a higher stand-point.