here again Life is taken in a higher than its sense of _mere_ Life: it is life as intelligent and volitional energy. If the universe--the Absolute--can be said to be living, it must be said also that it is more than Living. Such a life--such existence--is what Aristotle has called _θεωρία_ and ἐνέργεια of the highest in man. It is mental and spiritual life. In its consummation it is the Idea--the absolute Idea--the totality which is and is aware of itself,--the developed unity of the Notion with Objectivity. This unity thus presented is what lies implicit to our perception in Nature: and thus the Idea, as developed in Logic, forms the prologue and presupposition to the Philosophy of Nature. [Footnote 1: Being (_das Seyn_) probably conveys much more to an English reader than is here meant or wanted. It is Being, where the distinction between essence and appearance has not yet emerged or been thought of. If being = τὸ ὄν, then essence (_Wesen_) = _τὸ ὄντως_ ὄν, the being which underlies and yet includes appearance. _Wesen_ has more right to the substantival vocable of Being: _Seyn_ is little better than an 'Is' or 'Be.' In writers of Locke's time, 'Being seems to mean a reality, an actually existing object, e.g. Clarke: 'There has existed from eternity some one unchangeable and independent Being.' 'What the substance or _essence_ of that Being is, we have no idea.' 'Essence,' says Locke, 'may be taken for the very being of anything, whereby it is what it is.' Of course Aristotle long ago noted Being as one of the terms with variety of implication; and his own fluctuation about _οὐσία_ is an obvious illustration of this. In the translation of the _Logic_, _Wesen_ is occasionally rendered by Being (e. g. Supreme Being); _Seyn,_ by existence. _Seyn_ here means so little that one can hardly find any word of sufficiently minimal content for it.] [Footnote 2: No doubt, as Dr. W. T. Harris remarks, _Notion_ (used by Dr. Stirling) is a quite insignificant rendering of Hegel's _Begriff_:--for which he proposes Self-activity. But, as he admits, that is just Hegel's way: he coins brand-new the old terms, and forces us, if we will follow him, to think full meaning into them.] [Footnote 3: See vol. ii, Notes and Illustrations, p. 408.] CHAPTER XXIX. THE SEARCH FOR A FIRST PRINCIPLE.