Prolegomena to the Study of Hegel's Philosophy, and Especially of His Logic
Georg Hegel · en
Science--such is Kant's conclusion--is of the definite and detailed,
of the conditioned. It goes from point to point, within the
enveloping unity of what we call experience, and which rests upon the
transcendental and original unity of consciousness. But a knowledge
of the whole--of the enveloping unity--is a contradiction in terms.
To know is to synthetise: you cannot synthetise synthesis. Knowledge
is of the relative: but an absolute and unconditional totality has no
relations. We may therefore, possibly, feel, believe in, presuppose
the absolute: but know it in the stricter sense, we cannot. It may be
the object of a rational faith. But as for knowledge, we can get on
in psychology without the invisible and immortal soul: we can carry
out sciences of the physical universe, without troubling ourselves
about the 'cosmological' questions of ultimate atoms or ultimate
void, of first beginning and final end: and no proofs will ever prove
the _existence_ of that 'ideal' of reason--briefly termed God--which
transcends and completes and creates all existence. Not that such Ideas
are useless even in science. They represent--if not without risks--the
faith and the presupposition which underlie the spirit of scientific
progress, and set before it an ideal perfection which it will do well
to strive after, though it can never get beyond approximations. What
is perhaps more important: this faith of reason science is as little
competent to disprove, as it is incompetent to prove it. Science is not
all in all: we are more than mere theoretical and cognitive beings.
The logic of science is not the sole code of our spiritual or higher
intellectual life;
'We live by admiration, hope, and love.'