Prolegomena to the Study of Hegel's Philosophy, and Especially of His Logic
Georg Hegel · en
But, as was to be expected, the unity and force are paid for by a
considerable surrender of catholicity. If Kant's utterances are
fused into comparative simplicity, the unification does not embrace
the whole of the Kantian gospels. What Fichte did in his earlier
stage--the stage by which he counts in the history of philosophy--was
to emphasise and exhibit in his systematic statement that priority or
supremacy of the 'practical' over the 'theoretical' reason which Kant
had enunciated, and to put in the very foreground that self or Ego
which Kant had indicated, under the title of 'transcendental unity
of apperception,' as the focus which gives coherence and objectivity
to experience. But to put the final presupposition at the head and
front of all, as a principle originating and governing the whole line
of procedure, is really to modify in a thorough-going way the whole
aspect of a doctrine and its inner constitution. Kant's way is quiet
analysis: from the given, or what is supposed given, up regressively
to its final presuppositions, its latent _prius._ He shows you the
thing is so, apparently without effort, by judicious application of
the proper re-agent, as it were. Fichte, on the contrary, pours forth
a strong current of deduction: Let it be assumed that so and so is,
then _must,_ or then shall, something else be; and so onwards. Instead
of a glance at the secret substructure of the world, you see it, at a
magician's mandate, building itself up; stone calling to stone, and
beam to beam, to fill up the gaps and bind the walls together. And you
must not merely read or listen. You are summoned as a partner in the
work; a work the author feels, only half-consciously, he has not yet
quite accomplished, and where therefore he complains of the bystander's
dullness.