The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 1 (of 4): Hegel's Aesthetik — Georg Hegel — John Shaqi
The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 1 (of 4): Hegel's Aesthetik
Georg Hegel · en
(_γ_) _Thirdly_, it is obvious there must be for our imaginative
perception a more inward bond of connection present in the
self-subsistence of the organism, if the unity is not offered us in
its rational, spatial, temporal, or quantitative relations such as
are presented in the examples of uniformity referred to, which, as we
have seen, the unique particularity of the parts can extinguish. This
identity is not sensuous and immediately present to perception in the
way the distinction between the members is presented; it is rather a
secret and _inward_ bond of necessity and harmonious relation between
the members and their form. If it were only inward, quite out of
reach of our vision, such a necessary unity would be apprehended only
in thought, removed from our sense-perception altogether. In such a
case, however, it would fail to enter into the beautiful object of our
vision, and what we found as such in the living, object would cease to
be the Idea in its own objective and phenomenal reality. Such a unity
must consequently enter into what is externally perceived, although it
is, as the ideal principle of life within it, not entirely apparent
to sense or confined in spatial dimensions. It appears in fact in
the individual totality as the universal ideality of its members,
constituting thus the fundamental basis which supports and holds them
together, the subject of the living subject. And this subjective unity
in organic life finds its first direct expression in feeling. In the
emotional life the Soul finds its true expression as _Soul._ For
soul the mere juxtaposition of limbs have no real truth, and in the
presence of its subjective ideality the purely spatial multiplicity
of external configuration ceases to exist. Such a manifold, with its
unique differentiations, its organic articulation of parts[228] is
no doubt presupposed; but when and in so far as the soul expresses
itself through such in feeling the more inward unity ever-present
to life asserts itself equally as the dissolution of all absolute
independence between the physical parts, which reveal now not merely
their _materia_, but also that wave of animation which fuses all in
their soul.
(_c_) To start with, however, we must observe that the emotional
expression of soul-life neither offers us the visual impression of any
necessary inter-dependence between the separate members, nor indeed the
perception of an identity which is necessary between such _physical_
articulation and the _subjective_ unity conferred on it by simple
feeling. We will investigate this more narrowly.