The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 1 (of 4): Hegel's Aesthetik
Georg Hegel · en
(_b_) It is moreover through this indeterminacy of the beauty of
Nature, originating in its inward principle of animation that (_α_)
both in virtue of the conception of life and the intuition of its true
notion no less than of the habitual types conformable to its adequate
presentment, we are able to distinguish between animals which are
beautiful and those which are ugly. Animals incapable of vitality,
such as the sloth, which creeps about with difficulty, and whose entire
mode of life is suggestive of incapacity for motion or activity, offend
our aesthetic sense for this very reason[238]. Activity and mobility
are precisely the qualities which assert the higher ideality of life.
For the same reason we condemn forms of amphibious life, certain
species of fishes, crocodiles, toads, and many kinds of insects;
an additional reason will influence our similar attitude to hybrid
species, where confusion of form marks the passage from one determinate
type to another; the ornithorhyncus is an example[239], an animal which
with its mixture of bird and four-footed beast may indeed astonish
us, but at the same time is repulsive to our sense of beauty. Such
feelings of repulsion can no doubt be traced entirely to our habitual
prepossessions which have moulded for the imagination a fixed type of
animal species consonant to experience. But even so there is already
actively present the intuitive surmise that the configuration of a
bird, for example, is related in its parts by a necessary principle
of unity, and cannot as such graft upon itself forms which belong
to other species without being thereby transformed into a hybrid
variety. Such abnormal deviations from type appear to us both strange
and contradictory. Neither the one sided narrowness of organization,
which is so defective and mean in its manifestation, that it exercises
no activity over the straitened conditions of its environment, nor
confusions and passages of type, which, albeit they are not so enclosed
within themselves, are unable to hold fast the distinctive features of
their type, belong strictly to the sphere of natural beauty.
(_β_) There is another sense in which we attribute beauty to Nature,
namely, when we have the collective picture of a landscape before us
rather than observe the living form of a simple object. Here we have
no organic articulation of parts such as is derived from their notion
and is presented to us as such ideal unity in spontaneous life. We have
instead a rich variety of objects both organic and inorganic, which are
united together on one or more planes of vision in their distinctive
features, contour of mountains, winding outlines of rivers, groups
of trees, huts, dwellings, palaces, and cities of mankind, ships,
roadways, heaven and sea, valley and rock-cleft. We find, in addition
to this variety and proceeding therefrom, a delightful or imposing
harmony which appeals to our sense and interests us.