The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 1 (of 4): Hegel's Aesthetik — Georg Hegel — John Shaqi
The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 1 (of 4): Hegel's Aesthetik
Georg Hegel · en
1. (_a_) We have already seen that the animal organism preserves its
determinate existence through a persistent evolutionary process of
its own in opposition to an environing inorganic Nature, which it
assimilates by means of consumption and digestion, compelling thereby
what is external to submit to that process, and asserting its own
independent existence by so doing. We found at the same time that
this living process is a system of activities, which is realized in
a system of organs, whose functional action consists in those very
activities. The one and single aim of this homogeneous system is
the self-preservation of the living totality thereof through such a
process. The animal life consists, therefore, in a life of sensuous
impulses, whose general course and satisfaction is realized in the
above-mentioned organic system. The living organism is for this reason
articulated in its parts under a _teleological principle_, and the
principle or end subserved is self-preservation. Life is immanent in
every member; they are united to life, and life is one with them. And
the net result of this animate process is that the animal is maintained
as a thing conscious of itself as an individual subject of feeling,
life and the self-enjoyment its singularity procures for it. We have
only to compare animal life with plant life to see the difference
implied in the absence of such a sense-consciousness. The plant simply
brings to the birth new specimens of its species, without even being
able to concentrate any single one on that point of negation, which
constitutes self-singularity. We must, however, add that even in the
animal organism and its life we never have actually before our eyes the
true manifestation of this _centre of unity_, but rather simply the
_manifold_ of its members. Life is still too deficient on the side of
freedom and in opposition to the mere caprice of sense-life to manifest
such a subjective individuality as is capable of breaking through the
external envisagement of its organic parts. The vital centre of such
activities in the animal organism still remains veiled from vision, and
all that we see are the mere outlines of the figure, and this for the
most part concealed from our view by feathers, scales, hair, fur, or
spines. There can be no question that coverings of this nature, though
characteristic of the animal world, are coverings which partake of the
form of the vegetable world. And it is precisely at this point that
the beauty of animal life declares its essential insufficiency. That
which the organism makes most visible to us is not the soul-principle.
That which is directed outward and throughout appears is not the life
within, but rather formations accepted from a lower plane of existence
than the essential embodiment of life. The animal is _only_ fully alive
beneath that outer crust, and consequently for this very reason that
its _inwardness_[262] is not wholly made real in a form adequate to