The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 1 (of 4): Hegel's Aesthetik
Georg Hegel · en
And what interests mankind mainly is some relation to
their own particular thoughts and aims. Even historically important
actions and events, with which the community is expressly associated,
appear in this field of relative appearances merely as a manifold of
isolated efforts. It is a varied collection to which each contributes
as he may, with aims by no means identical, some of which meet with
success while others miscarry, and indeed, be they ever so fortunate,
are significant in a very subordinate degree if we consider them as
contributions to the wellbeing of all. What the majority may carry
through, in contrast with the entire aggregate of events and the end
applicable to all[265], to which it furnishes its quota, is after all
a mere patch; nay, even men of eminent standing, who feel and are
fully conscious of the universal passage of events[266], as their own
world, are for all that clearly immeshed in the same net of particular
circumstances, conditions, and a thousand other hindrances involved
in their relative position. On all these grounds it is plain that in
this sphere of exterior life the individual world is unable to offer
us the vision of that independent and complete freedom of the living
principle, such as is essential to the true notion of beauty. It is,
of course, true that the immediate appearance of human reality and
its events and organizations is not without system, and as such is a
totality of activities; but this whole is rather in its appearance a
mere mass of isolated fragments. Moreover the practical concerns of
such activities are divided and subdivided into countless parts, and in
such a way that each single part is in touch with the merest fraction
of all; and, in short, however much individuals may remain steadfast to
their own purposes, and only bring forth to the light that which their
own interest has employed as a means, the self-subsistence and freedom
of their will remains more or less of a formal character, determined by
external circumstance or accident, and constantly thwarted by natural
causes[267].
This is the prose of the world, as presented to our own consciousness
no less than to that of others; a world of finitude and change, a world
immeshed in relation and submerged beneath the pressure of necessity,
a world from which no individual can extricate himself. The central
paradox of life confronts every unit of the living whole. On the one
hand there is the impulse of individuality to perfect its isolated
unity in self-exclusion; on the other there is the necessary condition
of dependence on others from which none may claim immunity. However
prolonged the struggle to overcome this contradiction may be the effort
of that interminable battle only terminates with life itself.