The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 1 (of 4): Hegel's Aesthetik
Georg Hegel · en
Laughter, after all, is a kind
of explosion, which it is impossible to exercise without restraint and
preserve the Ideal. Another example of this laughter, which is nothing
but laughter, occurs in a duet of Weber's "Oberon," throughout which
we are in a continual state of anxiety for the prima donna's throat
and lungs. How very differently the inextinguishable laughter of the
gods affects us in Homer, a sound which breaks from the blessed repose
of divinity, and rather expresses gladsome serenity than abstract
and wanton abandonment. Just as little ought weeping, devoid of all
restraint, to be introduced into the ideal work of art, of such a kind
as that we may hear in all its comfortlessness in another part of the
"Freischütz." And speaking generally, in music singing must take to
itself the kind of joy and rapture which we catch from the lark in the
open sky. Shrieking, whether of pain or delight, is not music at all.
Even in the expression of suffering the sweet tones of the plaint must
penetrate and clarify the sorrows, so that it continually may seem to
us worth all the suffering to arrive at such sweetness of plaint in its
expression. And this is the sweetness of melody, the singing of every
kind of art.
(_γ_) Regarded in a certain relation to this fundamental axiom of art
we may find some justification for the principle of irony in its modern
sense; but it must not be overlooked that irony is frequently destitute
of all real seriousness, and is particularly prone to expatiate over
bad subject-matter; and, in another aspect of it, it is apt to run to
seed in the mere yearning of emotion rather than actively participate
in practical life, as is proved by the case of Novalis, one of the
finer temperaments who have made this point of view their own, and
for lack of definite interest, or through shrinking from the real
world, are driven up and down, and cajoled into this sort of spiritual
consumption. This is the kind of yearning which will not descend
to mere practical business and production, because it is afraid of
soiling itself with the contact of finite things, although it already
secretly feels the defects of such exclusion. No doubt we find in
irony that absolute principle of negativity, in which the subject of
consciousness becomes self-centred through the annihilation of definite
relations and particulars; but in this case the act of annihilation
of definite relations and particulars, as we have already pointed out
when discussing the principle, is not, as in comedy, essentially in
its right place, simply exposing its own want of substance, but is
directed quite as often against everything else excellent in itself
and of sterling worth. Whether we regard irony, then, as this art of
universal destruction, or as the yearning of which we have spoken in
contrast with the true Ideal, it betrays a secret lack of proportion
and restraint which is detrimental to the artist. Substantive form is