The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 1 (of 4): Hegel's Aesthetik
Georg Hegel · en
(_β_) In opposition to the immediate and prosaic reality of objects,
then, this _show_ of things which is effected by the mind is the
wonder of ideality, a jest, if anyone cares to put it so, and an
irony directed against purely external existence. Only contrast with
it the preparations Nature or man has to make in ordinary life, the
countless instruments of every kind they have to employ to effect the
same result. What opposition the material of such objects--take a
metal for example--may offer to any active effect upon it. The world
of ideas, on the contrary, out of which art creates its products, is
a malleable and simple element, which readily converts everything,
which either Nature or man in his purely natural existence is forced
to leave bluntly just as they are, to the uses which are appropriate
to it. In the same way the objects of ordinary apprehension and man
as we meet him in everyday life are of no incommensurable wealth, but
subject to limitations--precious stones, plants, animals, etc., by
themselves are of a certain positive and particular character. But
man in his creative capacity is an entire world of content, which
he has filched from Nature, and piled together in the comprehensive
treasure-house of his world of images, and which he is now free to give
forth again simply and without the restraint of external conditions and
the detailed processes of actual phenomena. In this idealization art
stands midway between the purely objective and restricted existence and
the entirely subjective world of idea. It gives indeed objects, but
they are supplied from the life of mind; it offers them for uses other
than those which belong to them; it concentrates their entire interest
in the abstract form of the ideal show which it therewith manifests to
aesthetic contemplation, and to that alone.
(_γ_) Art consequently, through the ideality above explained, _exalts_
objects otherwise unimportant, determining them, despite their ordinary
character, in a fixed relation to her own medium and essential aim,
and by so doing secures from us a sympathy in subject-matter which
otherwise would not have enlisted our serious attention. We find the
same transformation in the relation of art to Time. Its position is
here too frankly ideal. That which in Nature rapidly passes by in art
is secured with permanence; the flash of a smile, the sudden curve of
roguish merriment on the lips, a glance, a gleam of sunshine, together
with all those evanescent traits of human life, events and accidents
which come and are gone, and are as quickly lost to memory. There is
nothing which she cannot wrest from momentary existence, and in this
respect even becomes the vanquisher of Nature herself.