The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 1 (of 4): Hegel's Aesthetik
Georg Hegel · en
A criticism similar to that we have directed to the representation by
art of the human form and its exterior clothing might be applied to a
whole multitude of things which make up the external show of life, or
minister to its wants, such as eating, drinking, and sleeping--things
necessary enough in themselves and useful to all men, which, however
much in their manifold variety, as constituent features of the physical
life of mankind, they may blend with those activities more directly
related to its spirit, do not themselves form part of such activities,
or stand in essential relation either to their determinations or
their interests, and thereby contribute to what is the truly ideal or
universal element in the content of human life. Physical aspects of
life such as these may no doubt receive poetical treatment in art;
and it is generally admitted that the descriptions of a poet such
as Homer in this direction adhere very closely to Nature. Yet we
find that even Homer, despite all his _ἐνέργεια_, all the vividness
of his presentment, is forced to limit his descriptions to general
observations; no one expects to find in him an entirely accurate
picture of the facts in all their detail as they actually would occur
in life. He may give us, no doubt, in his delineation of the bodily
presence of Achilles, the lofty brow, the prominent nose, the long
and stalwart legs, but he is not likely to include in the picture
every detail of the veritable existence of limbs point for point, and
the relation in which they stand to one another in colour, size, and
so forth, in other words to offer us Nature's reality instead of an
artist's portrait. And the reason is obvious inasmuch as in the art of
poetry the type of expression is always the universal concept of the
imagination as distinguished from the bare particularity of Nature.
Instead of the fact the poet always gives us the denominant, the word,
in which the particular thing is universalized; for the word is a
product of mental conception, and as such already carries in itself
the nature of a universal. One is entitled to say, of course, that
it is _natural_ in the formation of concepts and speech to employ a
nomenclature, the word, as such an infinite[288] abridgment of the
existence we find in Nature; but if we do so the Nature to which we
refer it would not merely be opposed to the natural existence with
which we compare it, but would be just that which cancels it. We are
therefore confronted with the question in what sense we use the word
Nature when we contrast it with the characteristic of poetry. The mere
undefined use of the word Nature by itself tells us nothing at all.
What poetry should always give us is the energetic, the essential,
the truly characteristic; and this fundamental expressiveness is
precisely the Ideal and not the merely immediate, to enumerate all the
details of which in the narration of an event or the portrayal of a