The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 1 (of 4): Hegel's Aesthetik
Georg Hegel · en
In the Ideal, however, it is precisely the particular individuality
which ought to persist in inseparable co-ordination with the
substantive reality, and to the full extent that freedom and the
self-subsistency of the subjective principle may attach to the Ideal
the world-environment of conditions and relations should possess no
essential objectivity independent of the individual in the subjective
aspect above referred to or already presupposed. For the ideal
individual is a self-enclosed totality, which already includes the
objective principle, and it must not be permitted to have independent
motion and development apart from the individuality of the subject;
otherwise the subject falls back into a purely subordinate position
in contrast to a world whose independence is already assured.
Consequently the universal must indeed be actual in the individual as
that which is in a unique sense its own, but not so as the property
of the individual, as a _thinker_, but as that of his _character_ and
_temperament._ To put the same truth in another way, what is required
for this unity of the universal and individual in art as opposed to the
mediation and differentiation of thought, is the form of _immediacy_;
and the self-subsistency which we claim here is the form of immediate
self-subsistency. With that, however, the element of _contingency_ is
associated. That is to say, so long as the universal and effective[301]
constituents of spiritual life, such as the self-subsistency of
individuals exhibits, are only presented to us in the immediate guise
of subjective feeling, temperament, and disposition of character, and
debarred any other category of existence, such are thereby already
given over to the contingency of volition and its realization. All
we have left us, then, is what is peculiar to each individual viewed
as such and his sensuous experience. Such a possession of what is
nothing more than personal idiosyncracy is unable to assert for itself
any further potency or necessity; it appears simply as inclusion of
content, fixed achievement and at the same time arbitrary commitment
of the wholly self-dependent subject to the influence of feeling,
disposition, energy, general ability, cunning, and talents, instead
of carrying out its realization over and over again according to a
principle of universal import and acknowledged stability.
This type of contingency, then, is the characteristic quality of the
condition which we required for the ground upon which all the varied
wealth of the Ideal is to appear.
(_β_) In order to make more clear the actual character of the reality
which is most adapted to artistic treatment we will contrast it with
that aspect of existence which is not so adapted.