The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 1 (of 4): Hegel's Aesthetik
Georg Hegel · en
(_γ_) In all such civic relations, then, we find that in a truly
regulated State the public authority is not impressed with the
imprimatur of any single person, but it is the general Will which
prevails here in its universality, a condition under which the
particular life of the individual has the appearance of vanishing or,
at least, of becoming of a quite subsidiary importance. In a condition
of things such as this the self-subsistency we were seeking for is
out of the question. And for this reason we required for the free
embodiment of individuality conditions which are precisely the reverse
of this, in which the validity of the ethical principle derives its
support from individuals, and only from individuals, men who make for
themselves a great place in the arena of life through the activity
of exceptional volitional power and the inherent greatness and
effectiveness of their character. With such right is simply that which
they choose to accept as such; and if that which is essentially moral
is compromised by their action, there is no all-constraining public
might which brings them to judgment and exacts punishment, but only
the right of that inner voice of necessity, which accentuates itself
as vital in particular character and through external circumstance
and condition and only thus is actually existent. This is what
differentiates _punishment_ from _revenge._ The punishment exacted by
law asserts the validity of the generally applicable and carefully
defined right against the violation of that right, and makes use of
the public power according to a definite process as its instrument, in
other words, it employs a tribunal and a judge, an instrument to which
personality is attached as something accidental. Even revenge may in a
similar way find a justification; but such as it has is based entirely
on the _subjective conscience_ of those who deal with the criminal act,
and, in pursuance of their own _private_ convictions, avenge themselves
on the unrighteous act and its perpetrator. The revenge of Orestes
is, for example, justifiable; but he exacted it under the direction
of the law which his own virtue prescribed, not as the execution of a
judgment and a right. In the condition, then, that we claim as the most
suitable for artistic treatment, that which is moral and just must be
throughout personal, in the sense that its source is exclusively in the
individual life, and it only is actual in such dependence. Moreover,
to proceed with our contrasted conditions, in regulated States the
external environment of man is made secure, and properly is protected,
and he is only permitted to retain in absolute independence for himself
his private views and opinions. But in that condition where the
essential features of a State are not found the protection of life and
property depends on the isolated energy and courage of each individual
by himself, who is compelled to look after his own security and that of
everything which belongs to him.