The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 1 (of 4): Hegel's Aesthetik — Georg Hegel — John Shaqi
The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 1 (of 4): Hegel's Aesthetik
Georg Hegel · en
must inevitably fall to pieces when confronted with the actual
conditions of life and the distorted view which is formed of them. The
force of circumstances is presented to the lower orders of society
on a totally different level from that in which it acts upon rulers
and princes. In Schiller's "Braut von Messina" Don Caesar is able to
exclaim, and justly: "there stands no higher judge than myself!" And
when he has to be punished he must himself give judgment and execute
it. He is, in fact, subject to no external necessity of right and
law, and even when punishment is the question is wholly dependent on
himself. The characters in the Shakespearean drama do not entirely
belong to the princely order and only partially are taken from mythical
sources, but they are placed in the era of civil wars, in which the
ties of social order and legislative enactment are either weakened
or shattered, and they secure from such a condition the exceptional
independence and self-sufficiency we are looking for.
(_b_) If we transfer our attention now from the characteristic
conditions of society we have hitherto mainly considered to the actual
state of the world around us and its carefully articulated scheme
of ethical, judicial, and political institutions, we shall not fail
to observe that the material we have here offered us for figures of
truly ideal type is of a very restricted character. The province
here in which an entirely open field is presented for the display of
independent purpose in its fullest individuality is limited both in
its range and the measure of opportunity. The qualities that make a
man thorough in his relations to his own family and his business, the
ideals, in short, of honest citizens and excellent wives, in so far
as will and activity are concentrated on the field in which it is
still possible for a man to exercise his free personality, to carry
out, in short, all that he has a mind to do, this is the prevailing
feature of our modern society. Such ideals inevitably lack the depth
of a fuller content, and the most significant feature of them is
that of the attitude of the individual mind to their realization;
for we find here the content is already presented by existing social
institutions, and consequently the essential interest we take in it
depends on the particular way in which that content is realized and
appears in the _personal life_, its moral and inward significance.
For this reason it is not possible, as in the case of former times,
to create ideals from the positions of judgeship and kingship. If a
man carries out his judicial functions nowadays in accordance with
duty and the requirements of his office, he merely is acting within
the bounds already marked out for him by legislative enactments in
the social order as the sphere of his responsibilities. All that may
characterize his tenure of office beyond this, as proceeding from
personal qualities, such as suavity of demeanour or acuteness of