The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 1 (of 4): Hegel's Aesthetik
Georg Hegel · en
The situation expressed in general terms is in one aspect of it the
circumstance _particularized_ to the point of _definite character_,
and under this characterization it is, to put it another way, the
stimulating impulse to a particular expression of content, which it
is the function of artistic presentation to transmute into a specific
form of existence. Looked at from this latter point of view especially
the situation offers a wide field for contemplation, inasmuch as it
has ever been one of the most essential objects of art to discover
situations of real interest, that is to say, of such a kind as will
present to us the profound and weighty interest, the truest content of
spiritual life. The requirements of the several arts in this respect no
doubt differ. Sculpture, for example, is pre-eminently limited in its
reference to the inwardly detailed variety of situations. Painting and
music are already operative in a freer and more comprehensive medium.
Finally, we are least able among them all to exhaust the possibilities
of poetry in this respect.
Since we have not yet arrived at that portion of our subject where we
deal directly with the specific arts, it will be sufficient here to
draw attention to a few of the most general aspects of that inquiry,
which we may subdivide in the following manner.
_First_, we would observe that the situation still retains the
form of _universality_ and thereby of _indeterminacy_, so long as
it is undeveloped and without definite characterization; we have,
consequently, at first present before us a situation which is without
situation. For the form of indeterminacy is itself only _one_ form
as opposed to its contradiction of determinacy, and is shown to be,
by virtue of this very contrast, a one-sided aspect which as such
possesses a determinate relation.
_Secondly_, however, the situation passes in separation away from this
universality, and becomes certainly determinate to that extent, but at
first with a determinacy which produces no destructive consequences,
that is to say, it is one which offers no stimulus to _active
opposition_ and its necessary resolution.
_Thirdly_, we find the element of _disunion_ in all its vigour creating
by the definition of its opposed characteristics the essence of the
situation, which thereby is carried into a _collision_, which again
proceeds to reactions, and, as such, forms the point of departure to
the conception of artistic action properly so called.
We may, in fact, characterize the situation generally as the
_intermediate plane_ between the universal world-condition still in
a state of equilibrium, and the concrete action unfolded in all its
tendency to movement and reaction, a position which gives to it the
characteristics of both extremes, and enables us to pass over from the
one to the other.
_(a) The Absence of Situation_[315]