The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 1 (of 4): Hegel's Aesthetik
Georg Hegel · en
_Thirdly_, there are divisions which are caused entirely by disruption
in the Spirit alone; to these alone we are justified in attaching the
peculiar interest of contradiction which is bound up with genuine
_human activity_.
(_α_) Now with reference to the first type of conflicting forces--for
the reason that here it is only external Nature, through the
maladies and other evils and infirmities which are incidental to
her creating, conditions which destroy the pre-existent harmony of
life, replacing such with a state of antagonism--such can at most
merely serve as a stimulus for something outside them. Regarded
wholly by themselves such collisions are of no interest; they are the
subject-matter of art simply for the sake of the disruption which may
follow as a _consequence_ of some natural misfortune. The "Alcestis"
of Euripides, we may add, too, that of Gluck, the subject of whose
opera is practically the same, are examples of this; in both the
sickness of Admetus is necessarily presupposed. That sickness merely
by itself could not fitly supply a subject for artistic treatment.
It only becomes, even in the handling of Euripides, associated with
it by virtue of the individual characters, who, on account of such
misfortune, are compelled to face a further collision. It is the word
of the oracle that Admetus must die unless another will pass to the
underworld for his sake. Alcestis, out of love for her husband, devotes
herself to such a sacrifice, resolves to die, in order to restrain
Death from touching her beloved, the father of her children, the king.
In the Philoctetes of Sophocles a physical malady is also the cause of
the collision. Here the Greeks during their voyage to Troy place the
man who is suffering from a wounded foot, caused by the serpent's bite
in Chrysas, on the island of Lemnos. In this case, too, the physical
mishap is merely the extreme meeting point and incentive of a further
collision. For, according to the prophecy, Troy can only fall when the
arrows of Hercules are in the hands of the storming army. Philoctetes
refuses to give them up because he has been compelled for nine years
to suffer the martyrdom of his banishment. This refusal, no less than
the fact of his unrighteous desertion from which it springs, could have
been followed by every variety of result other than that which took
place; the real interest accordingly does not centre in the malady and
its physical necessity, but in the opposition which arises from the
refusal of Philoctetes to surrender the arrows. The case of the plague
in the Greek camp before Troy is very similar; although this is already
represented entirely as the consequence of former transgression, as a
punishment, in short, a mode of statement more adapted to epic than
dramatic poetry, nevertheless it is closely associated with evils
incidental to natural misfortune such as storm, shipwreck, and drought.
As a rule, however, art will not represent such mischance as mere