The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 1 (of 4): Hegel's Aesthetik
Georg Hegel · en
There is a _third_ type of collision which, while being immediately
connected with that we have just considered, is equally removed from
the genuine Ideal. It is to be found affecting that class of persons
who attempt to assert some privilege which the mere fact of birth
concedes them and supports with the full weight of a religious title,
positive enactments, and the prevailing conditions of society. In such
a case, it is true, we have an independent position in harmonious
relation with what is externally realized in positive institutions,
but when considered as the mere consistency of that which is in itself
unjust and irrational it is quite as much as in our former example a
purely formal independence, and the notion of the Ideal disappears.
We may, no doubt, very possibly persuade ourselves that the Ideal is
retained because we have here an appearance as though the personal life
is in full union with the universal and its legalized constitution,
remaining consistently in such unity; but it will be observed that here
the universal does not assert its dominating power in the _particular
person_, as we found the heroic Ideal demanded, but only in and through
the public authority of positive laws and their administration;
moreover, what the individual here asserts is assumed to be essentially
wrong, and he loses in consequence the substantive significance which
we have seen to be also essential to the Ideal. An affair in which the
ideal subject of art is concerned must itself be at bottom true and
justifiable. To this type belong the legalized lordship exercised over
slaves or serfs, the right to rob a foreigner of his liberty, or to
sacrifice the same to the gods. No doubt it is quite possible that such
a right may be sustained by individuals with unquestioning belief that
they are justified in so doing, as in India, for example, the higher
castes make use of their privileges, or as Thoas ordered the sacrifice
of Orestes, or in Russia the lords are wont to flout their serfs.
In fact, those who are in authority are very likely to execute such
rights as legalized rights on account of the interest they may have in
preserving them. But in a case of this kind their right will be merely
the unrighteous right of the barbarian, and they must themselves appear
to us in the category of barbarians, at least, who resolve to carry
out and perfect what is essentially injustice. The legalized form,
under which the individual shelters himself, is, for the time to which
it belongs, and its spirit and the educational standard adapted to
it, no doubt to be respected and justified. But if we reflect upon it
rationally and apart from that, it is wholly positive[321], containing
no intrinsic claims or authority. Moreover, if the individual makes use
of his privileges for purely personal objects, under the mastery of
particular passions and the aims of mere selfishness, in addition to
our barbarian we get a bad character to boot.