The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 1 (of 4): Hegel's Aesthetik
Georg Hegel · en
movement, regarded as a homogeneous whole, belongs no more to the
province of the mere situation and its conflicts; we are carried now
into that portion of our inquiry to which we have already given the
name of the genuine action.
3. THE ACTION
In the development of the subject under consideration, the _action_
immediately follows after the universal _world-condition_ and the
particular _situation._ In considering the action in its external
relation to that portion of our inquiry we have just concluded it will
be well to bear in mind the result we arrived at, that it presupposes
circumstances which necessitate collisions, action, and reaction. It
is impossible to determine at what point in the circumstances thus
presupposed the action will _begin._ For that which in one aspect will
appear as commencement will very possibly present itself in another as
the result of earlier developments, and to that extent will postpone
the real starting-point. And in like manner this, too, we may regard
as a fact resulting from former collisions. To take an example; in
the house of Agamemnon Iphigenia in Tauris expiates the guilt and
misfortune of her family. The commencement here of this deliverance on
the part of Iphigenia is the fact that Diana carries her to Tauris.
This circumstance is, however, merely the result of earlier stages of
the story, such as the sacrifice in Aulis, which is again conditioned
by the injury done to Menelaus in the rape of Helen by Paris, and so
on, ever backward, until we come to the famous egg of Leda. In the same
way the events which are the subject-matter of the Iphigenia in Tauris
presuppose the murder of Agamemnon, and all the crimes associated
with the house of Tantalus. An analysis of much the same character
might be applied to the Theban circle of mythos. If an action is to
be represented with all the facts that condition it, poetry is the
only real art that can attempt this. Such a complete exposition of
historical fact has already become, as a certain proverb reminds us,
rather a wearisome business; it is, in fact, more within the province
of simple prose, and, in contrast with such completeness, poetry will
rather consider its true function to be that of taking its audience at
once into the heart of the matter. There is a further important reason
why it should not be to the interest of art to make its commencement
from that point where we find the action under consideration is in the
first instance externally conditioned, and it is this: such a point
of departure is, after all, only related to the process regarded
as natural or historical fact[323]. The association of the action
with this commencement merely concerns the empirical unity of its
appearance; it may, however, in itself be of no significance at all
to the real content of the action. This external unity of historical
sequence remains just as it was, however it may chance that one
particular person is affected by the involved threads of a varying