The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 1 (of 4): Hegel's Aesthetik
Georg Hegel · en
necessary to observe, however, that we shall arrive at no "open sesame"
with Ahs and Ohs, a damn here and there thrown in, or any other random
note of storm and bluster. The inspiration of mere interjections is a
feeble one, or rather is simply the way in which the still unrefined
nature expresses itself. The spirit which is to reveal to us pathos
must be a spirit which is full to running over, which is able to spread
itself abroad and give expression to its virtue.
We may add, too, that in this respect Goethe and Schiller present a
most marked contrast. Goethe is less pathetic than Schiller, makes
use of a mode of artistic expression which is more intensive; more
especially in his lyrics we are struck by this characteristic of
self-reserve. His songs, and this is the true quality of the pure
lyric, go naturally on their way, without entirely giving us all
that they contain. Schiller, on the contrary, is clearly anxious to
unfold the pathos of his subject to its furthest limit, and with all
the clearness and force of expression he can muster. Claudius in
"Wands-becker Boten"[354] has contrasted Voltaire and Shakespeare in
much the same fashion, maintaining that the one _is_ what the other
only _appears_ to be. "Master Arouet tells us: 'I weep'; Shakespeare
really weeps!" To this we can only reply that it is precisely with such
telling and appearance that art is concerned and not with the mere
positive fact. If Shakespeare merely wept while Voltaire made others
think he wept, so much the worse for the poet Shakespeare.
To conclude, then, it is necessary that pathos, in order to be in
itself concrete, as it should be in ideal art, be presented in its
artistic manifestation as the pathos issuing from a spiritual nature,
rich and comprehensive. And this result carries us forward to that
third aspect of our consideration of "the action" already adverted to,
that is to say, an inquiry into what is implied by _character_ in this
connection.
_(c) Character_
We will summarize the proceeding argument. Our point of departure was
the _universal_ and substantive powers which are the original stimulus
to action. Such require as the medium of their active realization human
_individuality_, in which they then appear as _affecting_ pathos[355].
But, furthermore, the universal inherent in these powers must in
particular individuals acquire the concentrated unity and concreteness
of a _whole_, and a _single whole._ This totality is man apprehended in
his fulfilled spiritual content and the subjectivity therein comprised,
in one word the entire self-contained human individuality which we
designate as character. The gods are born into the pathos of men, and
pathos in its more concrete form of activity is human character.