The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 1 (of 4): Hegel's Aesthetik
Georg Hegel · en
(_α_) And first we would draw attention to the fact that this
pathos, though an essential feature in the development of completed
individuality, is not, in the specific form of its appearance, the
_sole_ or exclusive interest of the individuality portrayed. It is,
in fact, merely one aspect of the efficient[358] character, if one
of paramount importance. To put it in rather a strong way, the human
soul does not merely carry within it _one_ god as the original of
its pathos; on the contrary, the spiritual scope of humanity has
wider borders, and we may affirm that many gods make their dwelling
in one true man, or, rather, all the powers which are scattered
throughout the heaven of the gods are enclosed within that one breast.
It is co-extensive with the entire field of Olympus. In this sense
one of old has said: "Out of thine own passions, O man, hast thou
created the gods." And, as a matter of fact, in proportion as the
intelligence of the Hellenic folk quickened, the number of their gods
increased; and, furthermore, the gods of their earliest days were less
intelligent, that is to say, they were god-like figures deficient both
in individuality and determinate character.
In this wealth of content, accordingly, it is necessary that the
character adequate to ideal art should display itself. And this is just
that which creates the interest we feel in a character, namely, that
a totality such as that we have above described emerges from it, and
the character, while reposing on its abundance, nevertheless persists
in perfect equality with itself, as one secure and self-excluding
subject. If the character, however, be not conceived and depicted as
this rounded and subjective unity, is abstract in the sense that
it is entirely the sport of one passion, such must then appear as
self-destructive[359], or at least cracked, weak, and without real
fibre. For the weakness and inertness of individuals is just this very
thing, that the eternal forces of which we have spoken never assert
themselves in them as a real part of their most essential substance,
as, to put it logically, predicates which adhere to them as the
subjects of such.