The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 1 (of 4): Hegel's Aesthetik
Georg Hegel · en
In all the directions enumerated above the Ideal is in immediate
contact with the reality of the practical world in its everyday dress,
or in other words, with the commonplace prose of life. And impressed by
this fact we may easily be led to the conclusion, if we have already
accepted the nebulous conception of idealism elaborated recently,
that art can have no alternative but to dissever herself absolutely
from all connection with this world of relative appearances. Such at
least can only be logically inferred from a theory which assumes that
this relation of externality is one of pure indifference, or rather,
in contrast to the subjective world of spirit, is of no substantive
significance or worth. Agreeably to this view art is a spiritual
dominion, whose sole object is to exalt us above the sphere of material
wants, necessities, and dependence, and to liberate us from the
logic, and we may add the comedy, of facts, which in this field claim
the exclusive attention of our humanity. For, apart from any other
consideration, all that meets us upon this _terra firma_ of life's
prose is for the most part of a purely conventional character, and,
conditioned as it is by time, space, and custom, simply a congeries
of contingent facts, which it is derogatory to the nature of art to
accept. This view of ideality, which is really an illusive one, is
in part due to one of those highly flavoured abstractions of our
latter-day thinking, in which we merely find that the thinker's courage
has failed him to come to terms with the external world in question;
in part also it is due to that type of prepossession which drives a
man to assert summarily his independence of practical necessities
when the advantages of birth, status, and social position have not
already effected this for him. For such a man the only relief available
is a complete withdrawal into the secret world of the emotions, a
prison-house of unreality he steps out of never. Here he remains
in what he conceives to be the temple of wisdom gazing ecstatic at
what he takes to be the stars, and naturally values at the price of
a nutshell all that is found on the Earth. The real Ideal, however,
is not confined to the shadow-like world of the emotions, but in its
perfected whole must freely borrow from the definite structure of
external objects of sight in every direction. And the reason of this
is that man himself, whose nature is the central source that gives
to that Ideal all its significance, is alive, and his life is only
actual in a particular place and time, as one with the Present, as the
individualized type of infinity[366]; and in short the opposition of
an external garland of Nature is a fundamental characteristic of his
life and its association with him and his activity is imperative. It
follows that if this activity is to be apprehended by art, not merely
as belonging to man alone, but in the specific form it may take in