The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 1 (of 4): Hegel's Aesthetik
Georg Hegel · en
And here we close our consideration of the principle accordant with
which we have rendered more clear that aspect of the unity of the
inner life with its natural environment which we posited as secret or
potential, not at any rate directly due to human activity.
(_b_) The second phase of this harmonious relation may be explained
more positively, being expressly due to man's own activity and his
adaptation of means to ends. For man adapts external objects to his
own uses and, by means of the satisfaction which his work supplies,
places himself in a harmonious relation to them. In contrast therefore
to our first indefinite[384], and, in fact, entirely general type of
harmonious association the present one is directly concerned with what
is particular, as exemplified in the particular needs of man and their
satisfaction by his converting to his use such natural objects as he
may require. The range of his wants and the consequent impulse of their
satisfaction is of a practically unlimited variety; yet it is nothing
in comparison with the variety of Nature herself. Simplification is
therefore inseparable from the task whereby, our humanity imposes on
the facts of Nature its own vital purposes, and interpenetrates the
external world with its own volitions. In this way man's environment is
humanized; he proves by his own acts that it is capable of satisfying
his nature and is unable to preserve any predominant independence over
against him. Here at last, by virtue, that is, of his own productive
exertions, we find him no longer in a merely general sense of the term,
but actually in every detail of his particular surroundings a real
centre of his own substance and at home.