The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 1 (of 4): Hegel's Aesthetik
Georg Hegel · en
(_γ_) But even assuming that we abstract from an objective principle
of art, and retain the beautiful as established on the subjective
and individual taste, we shall soon discover, from the point of view
of art itself, that the imitation of natural objects, which appeared
to be a universal principle, and indeed one secured by important
authorities, is not to be relied upon, at least under this general
and wholly abstract conception of it. If we look at the particular
arts we cannot fail to observe that, albeit painting and sculpture
portray objects which resemble those of Nature, or the type of which
is essentially borrowed from Nature, the works of architecture on the
contrary--and this, too, is one of the _fine_ arts--quite as little as
the compositions of poetry, to the extent at least that these latter
are not restricted to mere description, cannot justly be described as
imitations of Nature. At any rate, if we are desirous of maintaining
such a thesis with respect to the arts thus excluded, we should find
ourselves forced to make important deviations from the track, in order
to condition our proposition in various ways, and level down our
so-called truth at least to the plane of probability. But once accept
probability, and we should again be confronted with a great difficulty
in determining precisely what is and what is not probable; and in the
end no one could really think of or succeed, even if he did so, in
excluding from poetry all compositions of an entirely capricious and
completely imaginative[81] character.