The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 1 (of 4): Hegel's Aesthetik
Georg Hegel · en
But, on the other hand, if the object of instruction is so entirely
treated as an _end_ that the universal nature of the content presented
cannot fail to be asserted and rendered-bluntly and on its own account
explicit as abstract thesis, prosaic reflection or general maxim,
rather than merely in an indirect way contained by implication in the
concrete embodiment of art, then and in that case, by means of such a
separation, the sensuous, plastic configuration, which is precisely
that which makes the artistic product a _work of art_, is merely an
otiose accessory, a husk, a semblance, which are expressly posited
as nothing more than _shell_ and semblance. Thereby the very nature
of a work of art is abused. For the work of art ought not to bring
before the imaginative vision a content in its universality as such,
but rather this universality under the mode of individual concreteness
and distinctive sensuous particularity. If the work in question
does not conform to such a principle, but rather sets before us the
generalization of its content with the express object of instruction
pure and simple, then the imaginative no less than the material aspect
of it are merely an external and superfluous ornament, and the work
of art is itself a shattered thing within that ornament[99], a ruin
wherein form and content no longer appear as a mutually adherent
growth. For, in the case supposed, the particular object of the senses
and the ideal content apprehended by the mind[100] have become external
to one another.
Furthermore, if the object of art is assumed to consist in
utilitarian _instruction_ of this kind, that other aspect of delight,
entertainment, and diversion is simply abandoned on its own account
as _unessential_; it has now to look for its substance to the utility
of the matter of instruction, to which it is simply an accompaniment.
But this amounts to saying, that art does not carry its vocation and
purpose in itself, but that its fundamental conception is in something
else, to which it subserves as a _means._ Art becomes, in short, merely
one of the many means, which are either of use, or may be employed
to secure, the aim of instruction. This brings us to the boundary
line where art can only cease to be an end on its own independent
account; it is deliberately deposed either to the mere plaything of
entertainment, or a mere means of instruction.