The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 1 (of 4): Hegel's Aesthetik
Georg Hegel · en
An opposition of this nature is not merely present to mind in the
restricted confines of moral action; it asserts itself as a fundamental
severation and antithesis between that which is actual essentially,
and on its own account, and that which is external reality and
existence[104]. Apprehended in entirely formal terms it is the contrast
exposed by the universal, in so far as it is fixed in its substantive
independence over against the particular, as the latter is also on its
part rigidly exterior to it. In more concrete form it appears in Nature
as the opposition of the abstract law to the wealth of particular
phenomena, each of which possesses its specific characteristics. It
appears in mind as that between the sensuous and spiritual in man, as
the conflict of spirit with the flesh; it is that of duty for duty's
sake; of the cold imperative with particular impulses, the warm heart,
the sensuous inclinations and impulses, in a word with man simply as
individual. Or it appears as the harsh antagonism between the inward
freedom and the external necessity of natural condition, and, lastly,
as the contradiction of the dead, essentially emptied, concept, when
confronted with the fulness of concrete life, in other words, of theory
and subjective thought as contrasted with objective existence and
experience.
Such are antithetical points of view, the discovery of which is not
to be ascribed either to the ingenuity of reflective minds, or the
pedantry of a philosophical cult. They have in all ages, if in manifold
guise, occupied and disquieted the human consciousness, although it
is our more modern culture which has emphasized their opposition
most deliberately, and forced it in each case to the keenest edge of
contradiction. Intellectual culture, or rather the rapier edge of the
modern understanding, creates in man this contrast, which converts him
into some amphibious animal. He is compelled to live in two worlds
mutually contradictory; and in this divided house consciousness,
too, wanders aimlessly; tossed over from one side to the other it is
unable to discover permanent satisfaction[105] for itself in either
one side or the other. For, on the one hand, we see mankind confined
within common reality and earthly temporal condition, oppressed by
necessity and want, in Nature's toils, entangled in matter, in sensuous
aims and their enjoyment, dominated and whirled away by impulse and
passion. On the other hand he lifts himself up to eternal idea's, to
a realm of thought and freedom. As Will he legislates for himself
universal laws and destinations[106], he disrobes the world of the
life and blossom of its reality; he dissolves it in abstractions, that
the mind may vindicate its right and intrinsic worth by this very
dissolution of Nature's rights and such maltreatment, a process in
which he brings home to her again the necessity and violence he has
experienced at her hands. Such a cleavage of life and mind is, however,