The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 1 (of 4): Hegel's Aesthetik
Georg Hegel · en
From this tendency, and particularly from the opinions[122] and
doctrines of Friedrich von Schlegel, issued in all its manifold forms
the so-called _Irony._ The idea had its profounder root, as to one of
its aspects, in the philosophy of Fichte, in so far as the principles
of that philosophy were applied to art. Friedrich von Schlegel, as also
Schelling, made the standpoint of Fichte their point of departure.
Schelling passed wholly beyond it; Fried, von Schlegel elaborated it
in his own peculiar fashion, and then flung himself free of it. With
reference to the more intimate connection of the doctrines of Fichte
with one tendency of this irony, it is only necessary to emphasize
the following point in our present context, namely this, that Fichte
posits the Ego as the absolute principle of all knowledge, reason, and
cognition, and in fact posits it as the Ego which persists throughout
in its abstraction of pure form. For this reason this Ego is, in the
second place, wholly and essentially simple, and, on the one hand, it
is the negation of every particularity, attribute--in short, every
content--for every positive subject-matter[123] is overwhelmed in this
abstract freedom and unity. On the other hand, every content, which is
to pass muster for the Ego, is posited and recognized as exclusively so
in virtue of the activity of the Ego. Whatever is, is only in virtue of
the Ego; whatever is through me (that is, my Ego) I am in turn able to
annihilate.
Now if we abide in these entirely vacant forms, which originate in the
absoluteness of the abstract Ego, nothing can then be regarded as of
value in itself, that is, essentially and on its own account[124]. It
is exclusively produced by the subjectivity of the Ego. But this being
so, it follows that the Ego remains lord and master over everything.
In no sphere of morals or law, of all that is human or divine, profane
or sacred, is there anything at all which would not in the first
instance have to be posited by the Ego, and which consequently could
not equally be nullified by the same agency. This is nothing less than
making all that exists on its own actual and independent warranty a
mere semblance, not true and a part of reality on account of itself
and by its own instrumentality, but a mere _show_ in virtue of the
Ego, within whose power and caprice it remains at the free disposition
of such. To suffer its presence and to destroy it stands purely in
the favour of the Ego, which has attained the absolute standpoint as
essentially the Ego, that and nothing more than that.