The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 1 (of 4): Hegel's Aesthetik
Georg Hegel · en
executive mastery displayed in the grasp and imitation of natural
form as we find it in the objective world. For in certain stages of
the artistic consciousness and its reproductive effects the desertion
and distortion of the conformations of Nature is not so much due to
unintentional technical inexperience or lack of ability, as it is to
deliberate alteration, which originates in the mental content itself,
and is demanded by the same. From this point of view there is therefore
imperfect art, which, both in technical and other respects, may be
quite consummate in its _own specific sphere_, yet if tested with the
true notion of art and the Ideal can only appear as defective. Only
in the highest art are the Idea and the artistic presentation truly
consonant with one another in the sense that the objective embodiment
of the Idea is in itself essentially and as realized the true
configuration, because the content of the Idea thus expressed is itself
in truth the genuine content. It is appertinent to this, as already
noted, that the Idea must be defined in and through itself as concrete
totality, thereby essentially possessing in itself the principle and
standard of its particularization and definition as thus manifested
objectively. For example, the Christian imagination will only be able
to represent God in human form and with man's means of spiritual
expression, because it is herein that God Himself is fully known in
Himself as mind or Spirit. Determinacy is, as it were, the bridge to
phenomenal presence. Where this determinacy is not totality derived
from the Idea itself, where the Idea is not conceived as that which
is self-definitive and self-differentiating, it remains abstract and
possesses its definition, and with it the principle for the particular
mode of embodiment adapted to itself not within itself but as something
outside it. And owing to this the Idea is also still abstract and the
configuration it assumes is not as yet posited by itself. The Idea,
however, which is essentially concrete, carries the principle of its
manifestation in itself, and is thereby the means of its own free
manifestation. Thus it is only the truly concrete Idea that is able to
evoke the true embodiment, and this appropriate coalescence of both is
the Ideal.