The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 2 (of 4): Hegel's Aesthetik — Georg Hegel — John Shaqi
The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 2 (of 4): Hegel's Aesthetik
Georg Hegel · en
Apart from such considerations, however, the artistic types referred to
belong to the _forecourt_ of artistic symbolism, inasmuch as they are
generally incomplete, and to that extent _merely_ a search after art in
its truth. Such a movement no doubt presents the essential ingredients
of a genuine mode of configuration, but it lays hold of them in their
aspect of finitude, separation, and purely relative propinquity;
it fails consequently to rank on the same level. When we discuss,
therefore, the fable, apologue, and the rest we must treat these forms
not as though they belonged to _poetry_ in the specific sense, as it
differs among other things from music no less than the plastic arts,
but only with the view of pointing out the relation in which they stand
to the _generic_ types of art. It is only thus their specific character
can be elucidated. To such an object the notion of the genuine types of
the art of poetry, whether epic, lyric, or dramatic, will not assist us.
We propose now to differentiate these forms in the following order;
we shall begin with the _fable_, proceed after that to discuss the
_parable_, _apologue_, and _proverb_, and conclude our inquiry with the
_metamorphosis._
1. THE FABLE
Hitherto we have throughout merely dwelt upon the formal aspect of the
relation of an expressed significance to its embodiment; we have now
furthermore to elucidate the content, which declares its suitability
for such a mode.
In our previous consideration of the various aspects of the _Sublime_
we saw that at the point where we have now arrived, it is no longer a
matter of any importance to envisualize the Absolute and One in its
indivisible Power by means of the nothingness and impotency of the
created thing to rise up to that infinite transcendency. We are now
on the plane of the finite consciousness, and have only to concern
ourselves with a finite content. If we direct our attention conversely
to the genuine symbolical type, to which the comparative is under
a certain aspect equally related, we find that here that _inward_
aspect, which stands in opposition to the form up to this point
always immediately presented, the natural shape, that is to say, is
the spiritual, a truth that even in Egyptian symbolism received ample
illustration. To the extent, however, that everything natural is left
standing, and preconceived in its position of isolated _solidarity_,
the spiritual is also something both _finite_ and _defined_, that is
to say man and his finite aims and the natural maintains a certain,
albeit theoretical[81], relationship to these objects, a significant
suggestion and revelation of the same to the use and weal of mankind.
The phenomena of Nature, storms, flight of birds, the constitution
of the intestines of animals and so forth, in the significance they
possess for human interests, are now accepted in a totally different
sense to that they figured in the conceptions of Parsees, Hindoos, or