The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 2 (of 4): Hegel's Aesthetik
Georg Hegel · en
critics to discover our poet and draw attention to that aspect of his
invention which is so entirely his own. But for all that, as we have
already observed, in genuine works of art such forms as those we are
discussing can only be regarded as accessory, although we doubtless do
find in previous works on _Poetics_ such incidental features treated as
precisely those which go to make the poet.
Furthermore however, though unquestionably in the first instance
the two sides which have to be associated stand in a relation of
indifference to one another, yet in order to justify the subjective
relation and comparison, the embodiments must also in the character of
its content itself include the same relations and qualities under a
cognate mode to that which the significance intrinsically possesses;
the grasp of this similarity is, in fact, the one sure ground upon
which the setting forth of the significance in union with this specific
form rather than any other, and the envisagement of such import by
its means is based. Lastly, inasmuch as we begin here, not from the
concrete phenomenon, by the abstraction of a general characteristic
from that, but conversely from this universal itself, which the
intention is to have reflected in an image, the significance secures
the position which makes it stand out actually as the real object, and
as such is predominant over the sensuous picture which is the _modus_
of its envisagement.
The series in which we propose now to examine the particular types we
have mentioned as belonging to this phase of comparative art may be
indicated as follows:
_First_ in order, as most cognate to the previous stage, the _riddle_
will enlist our attention.
_Secondly_, we have to examine the _allegory_, in which as the main
feature we shall find the abstract significance assert a mastery over
the external form.
_Thirdly_, we have the class of the comparison in its strict sense;
_metaphor, image_, and _simile._
1. THE RIDDLE
The true symbol is essentially enigmatical in so far as the
externality, by means of which a general significance is made apparent,
still differs from the import it is intended to express: in other words
it thereby raises the doubt as to what is the exact signification
applicable to the form. The riddle, however, appertains to conscious
symbolism, and an obvious distinction between it and the genuine
symbol is to be found in the fact that in the former case the meaning
is clearly and fully _recognized_ by the propounder of it, and the
form which veils that which is to be interpreted by it is therefore
_intentionally_ selected for this very purpose. The genuine symbol is
both before and after the act of selection an unsolved problem, the
riddle, on the contrary, is essentially a problem that is solved. It is
therefore with very good reason that Sancho Panza exclaims: "I should
much prefer to hear the solution first and the riddle afterwards."